Peak Oil: March 2008

Thursday, March 13, 2008

THE PEAK OF WORLD OIL PRODUCTION AND THE ROAD TO THE OLDUVAI GORGE

Richard C. Duncan, Ph.D.1

Pardee Keynote Symposia
Geological Society of America
Summit 2000
Reno, Nevada
November 13, 2000

ABSTRACT
The Olduvai theory has been called unthinkable, preposterous, absurd, dangerous, self-fulfilling, and self-defeating. I offer it, however, as an inductive theory based on world energy and population data and on what I’ve seen during the past 30 years in some 50 nations on all continents except Antarctica. It is also based on my experience in electrical engineering and energy management systems, my hobbies of anthropology and archaeology, and a lifetime of reading in various fields.

The theory is defined by the ratio of world energy production (use) and world population. The details are worked out. The theory is easy. It states that the life expectancy of Industrial Civilization is less than or equal to 100 years: 1930-2030.

World energy production per capita from 1945 to 1973 grew at a breakneck speed of 3.45 %/year. Next from 1973 to the all-time peak in 1979, it slowed to a sluggish 0.64 %/year. Then suddenly —and for the first time in history — energy production per capita took a long-term decline of 0.33 %/year from 1979 to 1999. The Olduvai theory explains the 1979 peak and the subsequent decline. More to the point, it says that energy production per capita will fall to its 1930 value by 2030, thus giving Industrial Civilization a lifetime of less than or equal to 100 years.

Should this occur, any number of factors could be cited as the 'causes' of collapse. I believe, however, that the collapse will be strongly correlated with an 'epidemic' of permanent blackouts of high-voltage electric power networks — worldwide. Briefly explained: "When the electricity goes out, you are back in the Dark Age. And the Stone Age is just around the corner."

The Olduvai theory, of course, may be proved wrong. But, as of now, it cannot be rejected by the historic world energy production and population data.

1Institute on Energy and Man
5307 Ravenna Place NE, #1
Seattle, WA 98105
duncanrc@halcyon.com

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

THE PEAK OF WORLD OIL PRODUCTION AND THE ROAD TO THE OLDUVAI GORGE
Richard C. Duncan, Ph.D.1

Pardee Keynote Symposia
Geological Society of America
Summit 2000
Reno, Nevada
November 13, 2000

1. INTRODUCTION
The Olduvai theory is a data-based schema that states that the life expectancy of Industrial Civilization is less than or equal 100 years. We shall develop the theory from its early roots in Greek philosophy down to respected scientists in the 20th century. This approach is useful because, although the theory is easy to understand, it is difficult (i.e. distressing) for most people to accept — just as it was for me.

The Olduvai theory deals neither with the geology or the paleontology of the Olduvai Gorge. Nor is it prescriptive. Rather, the theory simply attempts to explain the historic world energy production (and use) and population data in terms of overshoot and collapse. I chose the name "Olduvai" because (1) it is justly famous, (2) I've been there, (3) its long hollow sound is eerie and ominous, and (4) it is a good metaphor for the 'Stone Age way of life'. In fact, the Olduvai way of life was (and still is) a sustainable way of life — local, tribal, and solar — and, for better or worse, our ancestors practiced it for millions of years.

No doubt that the peak and decline of Industrial Civilization, should it occur, will be due to a complex matrix of causes, such as overpopulation, the depletion of nonrenewable resources, environmental damage, pollution, soil erosion, global warming, newly emerging viruses, and resource wars. That said, the Olduvai theory uses a single metric only, as defined by "White's Law." But now it comes with a new twist — (((a will-o'-the-wisp))) — electricity.

Most of my industrial experience is in electric power networks and the energy management systems (EMS) that control them. Electricity is not a primary energy source, but rather an "energy carrier": zero mass, travels near the speed of light, and, for all practical purposes, it can't be stored. Moreover, electric power systems are costly, complex, voracious of fuel, polluting, and require 24h-7d-52w maintenance and operations. Another problem is that electricity is taken for granted. Just flip the switch and things happen. In short: Electricity is the quintessence of the 'modern way of life', but the electric power systems themselves are demanding, dangerous, and delicate. All this suggests that permanent blackouts will be strongly correlated with the collapse of Industrial Civilization — the so-named "Olduvai cliff," discussed later.

This paper is the backup for the accompanying slide show titled "The Olduvai Theory: An Illustrated Guide" (see Duncan, 2000c).

Definitions: ‘Oil’ (O) means crude oil and natural gas liquids. 'Energy' (E) means the primary sources of energy — specifically oil, gas, coal, and nuclear & hydropower. 'Pop' means world population. 'ô' means oil production per capita. 'ê' means energy production per capita. ‘G’ means billion (10^9). ‘b’ means barrels of oil. 'boe' means barrels of oil equivalent (energy content, not quality). 'J' means joule. 'Industrial Civilization' and 'Electrical Civilization', as we shall see, mean the same thing.

Industrial Civilization is shown as a pulse-shaped curve of world average energy-use per capita (ê). The 'life expectancy' (i.e. 'duration') of Industrial Civilization is defined as the time (in years) between the upside point when ê reaches 30% of its peak value and the corresponding downside point when ê falls to the same value (Figure 4). The new twist is that the Olduvai theory now focuses on the mounting problems with the high-voltage electric power networks — worldwide.

Civilization and Ready Kilowatt: Although the fossil fuels are still very important, electricity is the indispensable end-use energy for Industrial Civilization. To determine its importance, it is essential to distinguish between the primary energy consumed to generate electricity versus the primary energy consumed for all other (i.e. non-electric) end-uses, such as work and heat. Consider the following. We estimate that 42% of the world's primary energy in 1999 was consumed to generate electricity. This compares to oil's contribution to all non-electric end-uses of 39%; gas' contribution of 18%; and coal's contribution of a mere 1%. Moreover: When energy quality is accounted for, then the importance of electricity becomes very, VERY clear. For example, if you want to heat your room, then 1 joule (J) of coal is 'equal' to 1 J of electricity. However, if you want to power up your TV, then 1 J of electricity is 'equal' to 3 J of coal! So if you're going to worry about energy, then don't loose sleep over oil, gas, and coal. Worry about the electric switch on the wall!

2. ENERGY AND CIVILIZATION
Other factors remaining constant, culture evolves as the amount of energy harnessed per capita per year is increased, or as the efficiency of the instrumental means of putting the energy to work is increased. … We may now sketch the history of cultural development from this standpoint.
Leslie White, 1949
"White's Law"
Oil is liquid, power packed, and portable. It is the major primary source of energy for Industrial Civilization. (But not the major end-use source!) We have developed a new method of modeling and simulation and then used it to make a series of five forecasts of world oil production — one new forecast every year. Figure 1 shows the main results of our most recent forecast, i.e. Forecast #5. (Duncan, 2000b)

Figure 1. World, OPEC, and Non-OPEC Oil Production

Notes: (1) World oil production is forecast to peak in 2006. (2) The OPEC/non-OPEC crossover event occurs in 2008. (3) The OPEC nations' rate of oil production from 1985 to 1999 increased by 9.33 times that of the non-OPEC nations.

Figure 1 shows the historic world oil production data from 1960 to 1999 and our forecasts from 2000 to 2040. Note that the overall growth rate of oil production slowed from 1960 to 1999 (curve 1). In detail: The average rate of growth from 1960 to 1973 was a whopping 6.65 %/year. Next, from 1973 to 1979 growth slowed to 1.49 %/year. Then, from 1979 to 1999, it slowed yet further to a glacial 0.75 %/year. Moving beyond the historic period, Forecast #5 predicts that world oil production will reach its all-time peak in 2006. Then from its peak in 2006 to year 2040 world oil production will fall by 58.8 % — an average decline of 2.45 %/year during these 34 years.

The OPEC/non-OPEC crossover event is predicted to occur in 2008 (Figure 1, curves 2 &3). This event will divide the world into two camps: one with surplus oil, the other with none. Forecast #5 presents the following scenario. (1) Beginning in 2008 the 11 OPEC nations will produce more than 50% of the world's oil. (2) Thereafter OPEC will control nearly 100% of the world’s oil exports. (3) BP Amoco (2000) puts OPEC's "proved reserves" at 77.6% of the world total. (4) OPEC production from 1985 to 1999 grew at a strong average rate of 3.46 %/year. In contrast, non-OPEC production grew at sluggish 0.37 %/year during this same 14-year period.

The oil forecasting models, the application program to run them, and a User's Guide are all available free at www.halcyon.com/duncanrc/. (Duncan, 2000a)

The peak of world oil production (2006) and the OPEC/non-OPEC crossover event (2008) are important to the 'Olduvai schema', discussed later. But first let's have a look at the ratio of world oil production and world population. Figure 2 shows the historic data.

Figure 2. World Average Oil Production per Capita: 1920-1999

Notes: (1) World average oil production per capita (ô) grew exponentially from 1920 to 1973. (2) Next, the average growth rate was near zero from 1973 to the all-time peak in 1979. (3) Then from its peak in 1979 to 1999, ô decreased strongly by an average of 1.20 %/year. (4) Typical response: "I didn't know that!" (5) The little cartoons emphasize that oil is by far the major primary source of energy for transportation (i.e. about 95% of the oil produced in 1999 was used for transportation).

Figure 2 shows the world average oil production per capita from 1920 to 1999. The curve represents the ratio of world oil production (O) and world population (Pop): i.e. ô = O/(Pop) in barrels per capita per year (i.e. b/c/year). Note well that ô grew exponentially from 1920 to 1973. Next, growth was negligible from 1973 to the all-time peak in 1979. Finally, from its peak in 1979 to 1999, ô decreased at an average rate of 1.20 %/year (i.e. from 5.50 b/c in 1979 to 4.32 b/c in 1999). "You've gotta be kidding!"

The 1979 peak and decline of world oil production per capita are shown on page 11 of BP Amoco (2000), http://www.bp.com/centres/energy/ . Not to be missed.

Bottom Line: Although world oil production (O) from 1979 to 1999 increased at an average rate of 0.75 %/year (Figure 1), world population (Pop) grew even faster. Thus world oil production per capita (ô) declined at an average rate of 1.20 %/year during the 20 years from 1979 to 1999 (Figure 2).

The main goals in this study, as was mentioned, are to describe, discuss, and test the Olduvai theory of Industrial Civilization against historic data. Applying White's Law, our metric (i.e. indicator) is the ratio of world total energy production (E) and world population (Pop): i.e. ê = E/(Pop). Figure 3 shows ê during the historic period.

Figure 3. World Energy Production per Capita: 1920-1999

Notes: (1) World average energy production per capita (ê) grew significantly from 1920 to its all-time peak in 1979. (2) Then from its peak in 1979 to 1999, ê declined at an average rate of 0.33 %/year. This downward trend is the "Olduvai slope", discussed later. (3) The tiny cartoons emphasize that the delivery of electricity to end-users is the sin quo non of the 'modern way of life'. Not hydrocarbons.

Observe the variability of ê in Figure 3. In detail: From 1920 to 1945 ê grew moderately at an average of 0.69 %/year. Then from 1945 to 1973 it grew at the torrid pace of 3.45 %/year. Next, from 1973 to the all-time peak in 1979, growth slowed to 0.64 %/year. But then suddenly — and for the first time in history — ê began a long-term decline extending from 1979 to 1999. This 20-year period is named the "Olduvai slope," the first of the three downside intervals in the "Olduvai schema."

Bottom Line: Although world energy production (E) from 1979 to 1999 increased at an average rate of 1.34 %/year, world population (Pop) grew even faster. Thus world energy production per capita (ê) declined at an average rate of 0.33 %/year during these same 20 years (Figure 3). See White's Law, top of this section.

Acknowledgments: As far as I know, credit goes to Robert Romer (1985) for being first to publish the peak-period data for world energy production per capita (ê) from 1900 to 1983. He put the peak (correctly!) in 1979, followed by a sharp decline through 1983, the last year of his data. Credit is also due to John Gibbons, et al. (1989) for publishing a graph of ê from 1950 to 1985. Gibbons, et al. put the peak in 1973. But curiously, neither of the above studies made any mention whatever about the importance of the peak and decline of world energy production per capita.

The 1979 peak and decline of world energy production per capita (ê) is shown at http://www.bp.com/centres/energy/ . Have a look.

3. EVOLUTION OF AN IDEA
And what a glorious society we would have if men and women would regulate their affairs, as do the millions of cells in the developing embryo.
Hans Spemann, 1938
The seeds of the Olduvai Theory were planted long ago. For example, the Greek lyric poet Pindar (c. 522-438 BCE) wrote, "What course after nightfall? Has destiny written that we must run to the end?" (Eiseley, 1970)

Arabic scholar Ibn Khaldun (1332-1406) regarded "group solidarity" as the primary requisite for civilization. "Civilization needs the tribal values to survive, but these very same values are destroyed by civilization. Specifically, urban civilization destroys tribal values with the luxuries that weaken kinship and community ties and with the artificial wants for new types of cuisine, new fashions in clothing, larger homes, and other novelties of urban life." (Weatherford, 1994)

Joseph Granvill in 1665 observed that, although energy-using machines made life easier, they also made it more dependent. "For example, if artificial demands are stimulated, than resources must be consumed at an ever-increasing pace." (Eiseley, 1970)

But, as far as I know, it was the American adventurer and writer Washington Irving (1783-1859) who was first to realize that civilization could quickly collapse.

Nations are fast losing their nationality. The great and increasing intercourse, the exchange of fashions and uniformity of opinions by the diffusion of literature are fast destroying those peculiarities that formerly prevailed. We shall in time grow to be very much one people, unless a return to barbarism throws us again into chaos. (Irving, 1822)

The first statement that I've found that Industrial Civilization is likely to collapse into a primitive mode came from the mathematical biologist Alfred Lotka.

The human species, considered in broad perspective, as a unit including its economic and industrial accessories, has swiftly and radically changed its character during the epoch in which our life has been laid. In this sense we are far removed from equilibrium — a fact that is of the highest practical significance, since it implies that a period of adjustment to equilibrium conditions lies before us, and he would be an extreme optimist who should expect that such adjustment can be reached without labor and travail. … While such sudden decline might, from a detached standpoint, appear as in accord with the eternal equities, since previous gains would in cold terms balance the losses, yet it would be felt as a superlative catastrophe. Our descendants, if such as this should be their fate, will see poor compensation for their ills and in fact that we did live in abundance and luxury. (Lotka, 1925)
Polymath Norbert Wiener (1894-1964) wrote in 1950 that the best we can hope for the role of progress is that "our attempts to progress in the face of overwhelming necessity may have the purging terror of Greek tragedy."

[America's] resources seemed inexhaustible [in 1500] … However, the existence of the new lands encouraged an attitude not unlike that of Alice's Mad Tea party. When the tea and cakes were exhausted at one seat, the natural thing … was to move on and occupy the next seat. … As time passed, the tea table of the Americas had proved not to be inexhaustible … What many of us fail to realize is that the last four hundred years are a highly special period in the history of the world. … This is partly the result of increased communication, but also of an increased mastery of nature which, on a limited planet like the earth, may prove in the long run to be an increased slavery to nature. (Wiener, 1950)
Sir Charles Galton Darwin wrote in 1953:

The fifth revolution will come when we have spent the stores of coal and oil that have been accumulating in the earth during hundreds of millions of years. … It is to be hoped that before then other sources of energy will have been developed, … but without considering the detail [here] it is obvious that there will be a very great difference in ways of life. … Whether a convenient substitute for the present fuels is found or not, there can be no doubt that there will have to be a great change in ways of life. This change may justly be called a revolution, but it differs from all the preceding ones in that there is no likelihood of its leading to increases of population, but even perhaps to the reverse. (Darwin, 1953)
Sir Fred Hoyle in 1964 put it bluntly.

It has often been said that, if the human species fails to make a go of it here on the Earth, some other species will take over the running. In the sense of developing intelligence this is not correct. We have or soon will have, exhausted the necessary physical prerequisites so far as this planet is concerned. With coal gone, oil gone, high-grade metallic ores gone, no species however competent can make the long climb from primitive conditions to high-level technology. This is a one-shot affair. If we fail, this planetary system fails so far as intelligence is concerned. The same will be true of other planetary systems. On each of them there will be one chance, and one chance only. (Hoyle, 1964)
4. WORLD MODELS, ETC.
Perhaps the most widespread evil is the Western view of man and nature. Among us, it is widely believed that man is apart from nature, superior to it; indeed, evolution is a process to create man and seat him on the apex of the cosmic pinnacle. He views the earth as a treasury that he can plunder at will. And, indeed, the behavior of Western people, notably since the advent of the Industrial Revolution, gives incontrovertible evidence to support this assertion.
Ian McHarg, 1971
Jay Forrester of MIT in 1970 built a world model "to understand the options available to mankind as societies enter the transition from growth to equilibrium."

What happens when growth approaches fixed limits and is forced to give way to some form of equilibrium? Are there choices before us that lead to alternative world futures? … Exponential growth does not continue forever. Growth of population and industrialization will stop. If man does not take conscious action to limit population and capital investment, the forces inherent in the natural and social system will rise high enough to limit growth. The question is only a matter of when and how growth will cease, not whether it will cease. (Forrester, 1971)
The basic behavior of Forrester's world model was overshoot and collapse. It projected that the material standard of living (MSL) would peak in 1990 and then decline through the year 2100. Moreover, measured by the MSL (i.e. the leading and lagging 30% points), the life expectancy of Industrial Civilization was about 210 years. (Forrester, 1971, Figure 4-2). He used the world model to search for social (i.e. cultural, "conscious action") policies for making the transition to sustainability.

In our social systems, there are no utopias. No sustainable modes of behavior are free of pressures and stresses. … But to develop the more promising modes will require restraint and dedication to a long-range future that man may not be capable of sustaining. Our greatest challenge now is how to handle the transition from growth into equilibrium. The industrial societies have behind them long traditions that have encouraged and rewarded growth. The folklore and the success stories praise growth and expansion. But that is not the path of the future. (ibid., 1971)
He found that sustainability could be achieved in the modeled world system when the following five social policies were applied together in 1970:

Natural-resource-usage-rate reduced 75%
Pollution generation reduced 50%
Capital-investment generation reduced 40%
Food production reduced 20%
Birth rate reduced 30% (ibid., 1971)
Critics (mostly economists) argued that such policies were e.g. "blue sky" and "unrealistic". Fortunately, the project team was just then completing a two-year study using the more comprehensive 'World3' model. They too searched for social policies that might achieve sustainability in the world system. However, the World3 'reference run' (like Forrester's in 1971) also projected overshoot and collapse of the world system.

This is the World3 reference run, …. Both population POP and industrial output per capita IOPC grow beyond sustainable levels and subsequently decline. The cause of their decline is traceable to the depletion of nonrenewable resources. (Meadows, et al, 1972, Figure 35)
The World3 'reference run' (1972, above) projected that the industrial output per capita (IOPC) would reach its all-time peak in 2013 and then would steeply decline through 2100. Moreover, the duration of Industrial Civilization (as measured by the leading and lagging IOPC 30% points) came out to be about 105 years.

I first presented the Olduvai theory to the public in 1989.

The broad sweep of human history can be divided into three phases.
The first, or pre-industrial phase was a very long period of equilibrium when simple tools and weak machines limited economic growth.
The second, or industrial phase was a very short period of non-equilibrium that ignited with explosive force when powerful new machines temporarily lifted all limits to growth.
The third, or de-industrial phase lies immediately ahead during which time the industrial economies will decline toward a new period of equilibrium, limited by the exhaustion of nonrenewable resources and continuing deterioration of the natural environment. (Duncan, 1989)
In 1992, twenty years after the first World3 study, the team members re-calibrated the model with the latest data and used it to help "envision a sustainable future." But —

All that World3 has told us so far is that the model system, and by implication the "real world" system, has a strong tendency to overshoot and collapse. In fact, in the thousands of model runs we have tried over the years, overshoot and collapse has been by far the most frequent outcome. (Meadows, et al., 1992)
The updated World3 'reference run', in fact, gave almost exactly the same results as it did in the first study in 1972! For example: Industrial output per capita (IOPC) reached its all-time peak in 2014 (v. 2013 previously) and the duration of Industrial Civilization came out to be 102 years (v. 104 years previously).

Australian writer Reg Morrison likewise foresees that overshoot and collapse is where humanity is headed. In his scenario (i.e. no formal model), the world population rises to about 7.0 billion in the 2036. Thence it plunges to 3.2 billion in 2090 — an average loss of 71.4 million people per year (i.e. deaths minus births) during 54 years.

Given the current shape of the human population graph, those indicators also spell out a much larger and, from our point of view, more ominous message: the human plague cycle is right on track for a demographically normal climax and collapse. Not only have our genes managed to conceal from us that we are entirely typical mammals and therefore vulnerable to all of evolution's customary checks and balances, but also they have contrived to lock us so securely into the plague cycle that they seem almost to have been crafted for that purpose. Gaia is running like a Swiss watch. (Morrison, 1999)
The foregoing discussions show that many respected professionals have reached conclusions that are consistent with the Olduvai theory, to which we now turn.

5. THE OLDUVAI THEORY: 1930-2030
The earth's immune system, so to speak, has recognized the presence of the human species and is starting to kick in. The earth is attempting to rid itself of an infection by the human parasite.
Richard Preston, 1994
The Olduvai theory, to review, states that the life expectancy of Industrial Civilization is less than or equal to one hundred years, as measured by the world average energy production person per year: ê = E/(Pop). Industrial Civilization, defined herein, began in 1930 and is predicted to end on or before the year 2030. Our main goals for this section are threefold: (1) to discuss the Olduvai theory from 1930 to 2030, (2) to identify the important energy events during this time, and (3) to stress that Industrial Civilization = Electrical Civilization = the 'modern way of life.' Figure 4 depicts the Olduvai theory.

Figure 4. The Olduvai Theory: 1930-2030

Notes: (1) 1930 => Industrial Civilization began when (ê) reached 30% of its peak value. (2) 1979 => ê reached its peak value of 11.15 boe/c. (3) 1999 => The end of cheap oil. (4) 2000 => Start of the "Jerusalem Jihad". (5) 2006 => Predicted peak of world oil production (Figure 1, this paper). (6) 2008 => The OPEC crossover event (Figure 1). (7) 2012 => Permanent blackouts occur worldwide. (8) 2030 => Industrial Civilization ends when ê falls to its 1930 value. (9) Observe that there are three intervals of decline in the Olduvai schema: slope, slide and cliff — each steeper than the previous. (10) The small cartoons stress that electricity is the essential end-use energy for Industrial Civilization.

Figure 4 shows the complete Olduvai curve from 1930 to 2030. Historic data appears from 1930 to 1999 and hypothetical values from 2000 to 2030. These 100 years are labeled "Industrial Civilization." The curve and the events together constitute the "Olduvai schema." Observe that the overall curve has a pulse-like waveform — namely overshoot and collapse. Eight key energy events define the Olduvai schema.

Eight Events: The 1st event in 1930 (see Note 1, Figure 4) marks the beginning of Industrial Civilization when ê reached 3.32 boe/c. This is the "leading 30% point", a standard way to define the duration of a pulse. The 2nd event in 1979 (Note 2) marks the all-time peak of world energy production per capita when ê reached 11.15 boe/c. The 3rd event in 1999 (Note 3) marks the end of cheap oil. The 4th event on September 28, 2000 (Note 4) marks the eruption of violence in the Middle East — i.e. the "Jerusalem Jihad". Moreover, the "JJ" marks the end of the Olduvai "slope" wherein ê declined at 0.33 %/year from 1979 to 1999.

Next in Figure 4 we come the future intervals in the Olduvai schema. The Olduvai "slide", the first of the future intervals, begins in 2000 with the escalating warfare in the Middle East. The 5th event in 2006 (Note 5) marks the all-time peak of world oil production (Figure 1, this paper). The 6th event in 2008 (Note 6) marks the OPEC crossover event when the 11 OPEC nations produce 51% of the world's oil and control nearly 100% of the world's oil exports. The year 2011 marks the end of the Olduvai slide, wherein ê declines at 0.67 %/year from 2000 to 2011.

The "cliff" is the final interval in the Olduvai schema. It begins with the 7th event in 2012 (Note 7) when an epidemic of permanent blackouts spreads worldwide, i.e. first there are waves of brownouts and temporary blackouts, then finally the electric power networks themselves expire. The 8th event in 2030 (Note 8) marks the fall of world energy production (use) per capita to the 1930 level (Figure 4). This is the lagging 30% point when Industrial Civilization has become history. The average rate of decline of ê is 5.44 %/year from 2012 to 2030.

"The hand writes, then moves on." Decreasing electric reliability is now.

The power shortages in California and elsewhere are the product of the nation's long economic boom, the increasing use of energy-guzzling computer devices, population growth and a slowdown in new power-plant construction amid the deregulation of the utility market. As the shortages threaten to spread eastward over the next few years, more Americans may face a tradeoff they would rather not make in the long-running conflict between energy and the environment: whether to build more power plants or to contend with the economic headaches and inconveniences of inadequate power supplies. (Carlton, 2000)
The electricity business has also run out of almost all-existing generating capacity, whether this capacity is a coal-fired plant, a nuclear plant or a dam. The electricity business has already responded to this shortage. Orders for a massive number of natural gas-fired plants have already been placed. But these new gas plants require an unbelievable amount of natural gas. This immediate need for so much incremental supply is simply not there. (Simmons, 2000)
As we have emphasized, Industrial Civilization is beholden to electricity. Namely: In 1999, electricity supplied 42% (and counting) of the world's end-use energy versus 39% for oil (the leading fossil fuel). Yet the small difference of 3% obscures the real magnitude of the problem because it omits the quality of the different forms of end-use energy. With apologies to George Orwell and the 2nd Law of Thermodynamics — "All joules (J) of energy are equal. But some joules are more equal than others." Thus, if you just want to heat your coffee, then 1 J of oil energy works just as well as 1 J of electrical energy. However, if you want to power up your computer, then 1 J of electricity is worth 3 J of oil. Therefore, the ratio of the importance of electricity versus oil to Industrial Civilization is not 42:39, but more like 99:1. Similar ratios apply to electricity versus gas and electricity versus coal.

Au Courant King Kilowatt!

Question: Where will the Olduvai die-off occur? Response: Everywhere. But large cities, of course, will be the most dangerous places to reside when the electric grids die. There you have millions of people densely packed in high-rise buildings, surrounded by acres-and-acres of blacktop and concrete: no electricity, no work, and no food. Thus the urban areas will rapidly depopulate when the electric grids die. In fact we have already mapped out the danger zones. (e.g. See Living Earth, 1996.) Specifically: The big cities stand out brightly as yellow-orange dots on NASA's satellite mosaics (i.e. pictures) of the earth at night. These planetary lights blare out "Beware", "Warning", and "Danger". The likes of Los Angeles and New York, London and Paris, Bombay and Hong Kong are all unsustainable hot spots.

6. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The theory of civilization is traced from Greek philosophy in about 500 BCE to a host of respected scientists in the 20th century. For example: The 'reference runs' of two world simulation models in the 1970s put the life expectancy of civilization between about 100 and 200 years. The Olduvai theory is specifically defined as the ratio of world energy production and world population. It states that the life expectancy of Industrial Civilization is less than or equal to 100 years: from 1930 to 2030. The theory is tested against historic data from 1920 to 1999.

Although all primary sources of energy are important, the Olduvai theory postulates that electricity is the quintessence of Industrial Civilization. World energy production per capita increased strongly from 1945 to its all-time peak in 1979. Then from 1979 to 1999 — for the first time in history — it decreased from 1979 to 1999 at a rate of 0.33 %/year (the Olduvai 'slope', Figure 4). Next from 2000 to 2011, according to the Olduvai schema, world energy production per capita will decrease by about 0.70 %/year (the 'slide'). Then around year 2012 there will be a rash of permanent electrical blackouts — worldwide. These blackouts, along with other factors, will cause energy production per capita by 2030 to fall to 3.32 b/year, the same value it had in 1930. The rate of decline from 2012 to 2030 is 5.44 %/year (the Olduvai 'cliff'). Thus, by definition, the duration of Industrial Civilization is less than or equal to 100 years.

The Olduvai 'slide' from 2001 to 2011 (Figure 4) may resemble the "Great Depression" of 1929 to 1939: unemployment, breadlines, and homelessness. As for the Olduvai 'cliff' from 2012 to 2030 — I know of no precedent in human history.

Governments have lost respect. World organizations are ineffective. Neo-tribalism is rampant. The population is over six billion and counting. Global warming and emerging viruses are headlines. The reliability of electric power networks is falling. And the instant the power goes out, you are back in the Dark Age.

In 1979 I concluded, "If God made the earth for human habitation, then He made it for the Stone Age mode of habitation." The Olduvai theory is thinkable.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

REFERENCES
BPAmoco (2000). BP Amoco Statistical Review of World Energy (1968-2000). BP Amoco, London. http://www.bp.com/centres/energy/.
Carlton, J (2000). An Electricity Crunch May Force the Nation into Tough Tradeoffs. Wall Street Journal (October 10). p. A1.
Darwin, CG (1953). The Next Million Years. Doubleday, Garden City, NY. 210 p.
Duncan, RC (1989). Evolution, Technology, and the Natural Environment: A Unified Theory of Human History. Proceedings of the St. Lawrence Section ASEE Annual Meeting, Binghamton, NY. 14B1-11 to 14B1-20.
Duncan, RC (2000a). The Heuristic Oil Forecasting Method: User's Guide & Forecast #4. www.halcyon.com/duncanrc/ (Forecast #4). 30 p.
Duncan, RC (2000b). Crude Oil Production and Prices: A Look Ahead at OPEC Decision-Making Process. PTTC Workshop, Bakersfield, CA. (Forecast #5, September 22). 15 p.
Duncan, RC (2000c). The Olduvai Theory: An Illustrated Guide. Pardee Keynote Symposia, Geological Society of America, Summit 2000, Reno, NV. 6 p.
Eiseley, L (1970). The Invisible Pyramid. University of Nebraska Press, Lincoln. 173 p.
Forrester, J (1971, 1973). World Dynamics. Wright-Allen Press, Cambridge, MA. 144 p.
Gibbons, JH, Blair, PD and Gwin, HL (1989). Strategies for Energy Use. Scientific American, 261 (3), September, p. 86-93.
Hoyle, F (1964). Of Men and Galaxies. University of Washington Press, Seattle. 73 p.
Irving, W (1970). Journals and Notebooks, Vol. III, 1819-1827. University of Wisconsin Press, Madison, WI. 791 p.
Living Earth (1996). The Brilliant Earth: A Nocturnal Satellite Map. The Living Earth, Inc., Santa Monica, CA. Poster.
Lotka, AJ (1925). Elements of Physical Biology. Williams & Wilkins, Baltimore. 460 p.
McHarg, I (1971). Man, Planetary Disease. Vital Speeches of the Day (October). p. 634-640.
Meadows, DH, Meadows, DL, Randers, J and Behrens III, WW (1972, 1974). The Limits to Growth. New American Library, New York. 207 p.
Meadows, DH, Meadows, DL, Randers, J (1992). Beyond the Limits: Confronting Global Collapse, Envisioning a Sustainable Future. Chelsea Green, Post Mills, VT. 300 p.
Morrison, R (1999). The Spirit in the Gene: Humanity's Proud Illusion and the Laws of Nature. Cornell University Press, Ithaca, NY. 286 p.
Preston, R (1994). The Hot Zone. Doubleday, New York. 323 p.
Romer, RH (1985). Energy: Facts and Figures. Spring Street Press, Amherst, MA. 68 p.
Spemann, H (1938). Embryonic Development and Induction. Yale Univ. Pr., Newhaven, CN. 401 p.
Simmons, MR (2000). Energy in the New Economy: The Limits to Growth. Energy Institute of the Americas, Oklahoma City (October 2). 1 p.
Tainter, JA (1988). The Collapse of Complex Societies. Cambridge University Press, UK. 250p.
Weatherford, JM (1994). Savages and Civilization: Who Will Survive? Crown, New York. 310 p.
White, L (1949). The Science of Culture: A Study of Man and Civilization. Farrar, Straus & Co. New York. 444 p.
Wiener, N (1950, 1954). The Human Use of Human Beings: Cybernetics and Society. Doubleday, New York, 199 p.

Wiki Notes on Malthusian Prediction

Malthusian catastrophe,sometimes known as a Malthusian check, Malthusian crisis, Malthusian dilemma, Malthusian disaster, Malthusian trap, Malthusian controls or Malthusian limit is a return to subsistence-level conditions as a result of agricultural (or, in later formulations, economic) production being eventually outstripped by growth in population.[citation needed] For example, a recent science review in the New York Times raised the claim that the Industrial Revolution had enabled the modern world to break out of the Malthusian Trap.[1] Theories of Malthusian catastrophe are very similar to the subsistence theory of wages. The main difference is that the Malthusian theories predict over several generations or centuries whereas the subsistence theory of wages predicts over years and decades.

Contents [hide]
1 Traditional views
2 Neo-Malthusian theory
3 Application to energy/resource consumption
4 See also
5 References
6 External links

[edit] Traditional views
In 1798, Thomas Malthus published An Essay on the Principle of Population, describing his theory of quantitative development of human populations:

I think I may fairly make two postulata. First, That food is necessary to the existence of man. Secondly, That the passion between the sexes is necessary and will remain nearly in its present state. These two laws, ever since we have had any knowledge of mankind, appear to have been fixed laws of our nature, and, as we have not hitherto seen any alteration in them, we have no right to conclude that they will ever cease to be what they now are, without an immediate act of power in that Being who first arranged the system of the universe, and for the advantage of his creatures, still executes, according to fixed laws, all its various operations.
...
Assuming then my postulata as granted, I say, that the power of population is indefinitely greater than the power in the earth to produce subsistence for man. Population, when unchecked, increases in a geometrical ratio.

– Malthus 1798, Chapter 1, online[2]

A series that is increasing in geometric progression is defined by the fact that the ratio of any two successive members of the sequence is a constant. For example, a population with an average annual growth rate of, say, 2% will grow by a ratio of 1.02 per year. In other words, the ratio of each year's population to the previous year's population will be 1.02. In modern terminology, a population that is increasing in geometric progression is said to be experiencing exponential growth.

In contrast, in an arithmetic progression any two successive members of the sequence have a constant difference. In modern terminology, this is called linear growth.

If unchecked over a sufficient period of time, and if the ratio between successive sequence members is larger than 1.0, then exponential growth will always outrun linear growth. Malthus saw the difference between population growth and resource growth as being analogous to this difference between exponential and linear growth. Even when a population inhabits a new habitat, e.g. the American continent at Malthus' time, or when recovering from wars and epidemic plagues, the growth of population will eventually reach the limit of the resource base. (Malthus 1798, chapter 7: A Probable Cause of Epidemics).

[edit] Neo-Malthusian theory
Neo-Malthusian theory argues that unless at or below subsistence level, a population's fertility will tend to move upwards. Assume for example that a country has 10 breeding groups. Over time this country's fertility will approach that of its fastest growing group in the same way that

will eventually come to resemble

regardless of how large the constant a is or how small the constant b is. Under subsistence conditions the fastest growing group is likely to be that group progressing most rapidly in agricultural technology. However, in above-subsistence conditions the fastest growing group is likely to be the one with the highest fertility. Therefore the fertility of the country will approach that of its most fertile group. This, however, is only part of the problem.

In any group some individuals will be more pro-fertility in their beliefs and practices than others. According to neo-Malthusian theory, these pro-fertility individuals will not only have more children, but also pass their pro-fertility on to their children, meaning a constant selection for pro-fertility similar to the constant natural selection for fertility genes (except much faster because of greater diversity). According to neo-Malthusians, this increase in fertility will lead to hyperexponential population growth that will eventually outstrip growth in economic production. This appears to make any sort of voluntary fertility control futile, in the long run. Neo-Malthusians argue that although adult immigrants (who, at the very least, arrive with human capital) contribute to economic production, there is little or no increase in economic production from increased natural growth and fertility. Neo-Malthusians argue that hyperexponential population growth has begun or will begin soon in developed countries.

To this can be added that, unknown to Malthus, farmland deteriorates with use. Some areas where there was intensive agriculture in classic times (i.e., the feudal era) had already declined in population because their farmland was worn out, long before he wrote.

At the time Malthus wrote, and for 150 years thereafter, most societies had populations at or beyond their agricultural limits.[citation needed] After World War I, the growth rate of the world's population accelerated rapidly, resulting in predictions by Paul R. Ehrlich and many others of an imminent Malthusian catastrophe. However, the so-called Green Revolution produced a contemporaneous exponential increase in the world's food supply, and the date of the predicted Malthusian collapse had been temporarily forestalled, until the peaking of agricultural production began to occur in the 1990s in several world regions.

Pimentel and Nielsen, working independently, found that the human population has passed the numerical point where all can live in comfort, and that we have entered a stage where many of the world's citizens and future generations are trapped in misery.[3] There is evidence that a catastrophe is underway as of at least the 1990s; for example, by the year 2000, children in developing countries were dying at the rate of approximately 11,000,000 per annum from strictly preventable diseases.[4][5] This data suggests that by the standard of misery, the catastrophe is underway. The term 'misery' can generally be construed as: high infant mortality, low standards of sanitation, malnutrition, inadequate drinking water, widespread diseases, war, and political unrest.

Regarding famines, data demonstrates the world's food production has peaked in some of the very regions where food is needed the most. For example in South Asia, approximately half of the land has been degraded such that it no longer has the capacity for food production.[5] In China there has been a 27% irreversible loss of land for agriculture, and continues to lose arable land at the rate of 2,500 square kilometres per year.[6] In Madagascar, at least 30% of the land previously regarded as arable is irreversibly barren. On the other hand, recent data shows the number of overweight people in the world now outnumbers that of malnourished, and the rising tide of obesity continues to expand in both rich and poor countries.[7]

Many technologically developed countries have by 2006 passed through the demographic transition, a complex social development in which total fertility rates drop in response to lower infant mortality, more education of women, increased urbanization, and a wider availability of effective birth control causing the demographic-economic paradox. By the end of the 21st century, these countries could avoid population declines by permitting large-scale immigration. On the assumption that the demographic transition is now spreading to less developed countries, the United Nations Population Fund estimates that human population may peak in the late 21st century rather than continue to grow until it exhausted available resources.[8] Some have expressed doubt about the validity of the UN projections, claiming that they are below the projections by others.[5] The most important point is that none of the projections show the population growth beginning to decline before 2050. Indeed, the UN "high" estimate does not decline at all, even out to 2300, indicating the potential for a Malthusian catastrophe.[8]

The actual growth curve of the human population is another issue. In the latter part of the 20th century many argued that it followed exponential growth; however, a more recent view is that the growth in the last millennium has been faster, at a superexponential (possibly hyperbolic, double-exponential, or hyper-exponential) rate.[9] Alternatively, the apparently exponential portion of the human population growth curve may actually fit the lower limb of a logistic curve, or a section of a Lotka-Volterra cycle.

World population from 500CE to 2150, based on UN 2004 projections (red, orange, green) and US Census Bureau historical estimates (black). Only the section in blue is from reliable counts, not estimates or projections.Historians have estimated the total human population on earth back to 10,000 BC.[10] The figure on the right shows the trend of total population from the year 500 AD to 2005, and from there in three projections out to 2150 (low, medium, and high).[8] If population growth were exactly exponential, then the trend would be a straight line on this semilog graph. The fact that it has been curving upwards indicates faster-than-exponential growth over the last 1500 years of history. However, the United Nations population projections out to 2150 (the red, orange, and green lines) show a possible end to this phenomenon occurring as early as 2050 in the most optimistic scenario, and by 2075 in the "medium" scenario.

A chart of estimated annual growth rates in world population, 1800-2005. Rates before 1950 are annualized historical estimates from the US Bureau of the Census.The graph of annual growth rates (below) also does not appear exactly as one would expect for long-term exponential growth. For exponential growth it should be a straight line at constant height, whereas in fact the graph from 1800 to 2005 is dominated by an enormous hump that began about 1920, peaked in the mid-1960s, and has been steadily eroding away for the last 40 years. The sharp fluctuation between 1959 and 1960 was due to the combined effects of the Great Leap Forward and a natural disaster in China.[11] Also visible on this graph are the effects of the Great Depression, the two world wars, and possibly also the 1918 influenza pandemic.

Though short-term trends, even on the scale of decades or centuries, cannot prove or disprove the existence of mechanisms promoting a Malthusian catastrophe over longer periods, the prosperity of a small fraction of the human population at the beginning of the 21st century, and the debatability of ecological collapse made by Paul R. Ehrlich in the 1960s and 1970s, has led some people, such as economist Julian L. Simon, to question its inevitability.[12]

A 2004 study by a group of prominent economists and ecologists, including Kenneth Arrow and Paul Ehrlich[13] suggests that the central concerns regarding sustainability have shifted from population growth to the consumption/savings ratio, due to shifts in population growth rates since the 1970s. Empirical estimates show that public policy (taxes or the establishment of more complete property rights) can promote more efficient consumption and investment that are sustainable in an ecological sense; that is, given the current (relatively low) population growth rate, the Malthusian catastrophe can be avoided by either a shift in consumer preferences or public policy that induces a similar shift.

However, some contend that the Malthusian catastrophe is not imminent. A 2002 study[14] by the UN Food and Agriculture Organization predicts that world food production will be in excess of the needs of the human population by the year 2030; however, that source also states that hundreds of millions will remain hungry (presumably due to economic realities and distribution issues).

[edit] Application to energy/resource consumption
Another way of applying the Malthusian theory is to substitute other resources, such as sources of energy for food, and energy consumption for population. (Since modern food production is energy and resource intensive, this is not a big jump. Most of the criteria for applying the theory are still satisfied.) Since energy consumption is increasing much faster than population and most energy comes from polluting and non-renewable sources, the catastrophe appears more imminent, though perhaps not as certain, than when considering food and population continue to behave in a manner contradicting Malthus's assumptions.

Retired physics professor Albert Bartlett, a modern-day Malthusian, has lectured on "Arithmetic, Population and Energy" over 1,500 times. He published an article entitled Thoughts on Long-Term Energy Supplies: Scientists and the Silent Lie in Physics Today (July 2004). For a response to Bartlett's argument, see two articles on energy and population in Physics Today, November 2004,[15] and following letters to the editor.

A further way of analyzing resource limitation is the dwindling area for storage of soil contaminants and water pollution. The high rate of increase in toxic chemicals in the environment (especially persistent organic chemicals and endocrine altering chemicals) is creating a circumstance of resource limitation (e.g. safe potable water and safe arable land).

[edit] See also
Albert Bartlett
Beyond the Limits by Donella Meadows
Cannibals and Kings by Marvin Harris
Carrying capacity
Charles Galton Darwin
Club of Rome
Demographic transition
Dismal Science
Famine
Future energy development
Malthusian growth model
Malthusianism
Medieval demography
Neanderthals, Bandits and Farmers by Colin Tudge
Olduvai theory
Over-consumption
Overpopulation
Peak oil
Population growth
Survivalism
Sustainability
Tragedy of the Commons
The Ultimate Resource, a work by Julian Simon challenging the perceived dangers of overpopulation
World population

[edit] References
^ Review - A Farewell to Alms - Industrial Revolution - Human Population - New York Times
^ An Essay on the Principle of Population by T. R. Malthus (1798).
^ Ecologist Says Unchecked Population Growth Could Bring Misery
^ U.S. National Research Council, Commission on the Science of Climate Change, Washington D.C. (2001)
^ a b c Ron Nielsen, The Little Green Handbook, Picador, New York (2006) ISBN 0-312-42581-3
^ UNEP, Global Environmental Outlook 2000, Earthscan Publications, London, UK (1999) which may also be viewed at http://www.unep.org/geo2000/ov-e/index.htm, including an optional PDF download
^ Overweight 'top world's hungry', August 15, 2006. BBC
^ a b c 2004 UN Population Projections, 2004. (PDF).
^ Varfolomeyev, SD & Gurevich, KG, "The hyperexponential growth of the human population on a macrohistorical scale." Journal of Theoretical Biology, 212(3), pp. 367-72 (2001).
^ Historical Estimates of World Population, U.S. Bureau of the Census, 2006..
^ International Data Base.
^ Simon, Julian L, "More People, Greater Wealth, More Resources, Healthier Environment", Economic Affairs: J. Inst. Econ. Affairs, April 1994.
^ Arrow, K., P. Dasgupta, L. Goulder, G. Daily, P. Ehrlich, G. Heal, S. Levin, K. Mäler, S. Schneider, D. Starrett and B. Walker, "Are We Consuming Too Much" Journal of Economic Perspectives, 18(3), 147-172, 2004.
^ World agriculture 2030: Global food production will exceed population growth August 20, 2002.
^ Long−Term Energy Solutions: The Truth Behind the Silent Lie November 2004

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Korotayev A., Malkov A., Khaltourina D. Introduction to Social Macrodynamics: Compact Macromodels of the World System Growth. Moscow: URSS, 2006. ISBN 5-484-00414-4
Korotayev A., Malkov A., Khaltourina D. Introduction to Social Macrodynamics: Secular Cycles and Millennial Trends. Moscow: URSS, 2006. ISBN 5-484-00559-0
Korotayev A. & Khaltourina D. Introduction to Social Macrodynamics: Secular Cycles and Millennial Trends in Africa. Moscow: URSS, 2006. ISBN 5-484-00560-4
Turchin, P., et al., eds. (2007). History & Mathematics: Historical Dynamics and Development of Complex Societies. Moscow: KomKniga. ISBN 5484010020

[edit] External links
Essay on life of Thomas Malthus
Malthus' Essay on the Principle of Population
David Friedman's essay arguing against Malthus' conclusions
Daniel Quinn's New Renaissance speech
United Nations Population Division World Population Trends homepage
Retrieved from "http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Malthusian_catastrophe"

World Food Production

Hundreds of millions of people are still underfed, although there is more than enough food to go round. Fertilisers, pesticides, high-yielding seeds and mechanisation have boosted crop yields. Meat and fish production has quadrupled.

But doom-laden statistics on soil erosion, declining fish stocks, deforestation, nitrate pollution and genetic diversity are raising fears for the future.

And we are still way off course on the UN’s target of halving hunger by 2015.

How can we squeeze more from the degraded soil and depleted seas to feed the yet-to-be-born millions?

How can we provide long-term food security for those without the resources to buy or grow their own food? The race against population growth continues.

The Prediction

Population grows exponentially. That is, each generation is a little bigger than the generation before, and so more people have more children, and the next generation is bigger yet. Population grows faster and faster.
On the other hand, food production is limited by available farmland, water for irrigation, and so on, and so cannot grow without limit. Food production grows more and more slowly.

Therefore, it inevitably follows that as population continues to grow faster while food production grows more slowly, sooner or later population will outstrip food supply, and it just will not be possible to feed all the people. The logic is simple and irrefutable. Right?

Let's look at the facts.

The Reality

The United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization keeps statistics on world population and food production. Their broadest measure is an aggregate total of all food produced in the world. As this combines many different kinds of food, they express this total simply as a percentage of an arbitrarily-chosen baseline.1
Here are the FAO's figures2,3 for world population and food production. They have statistics available starting from 1961.

Year Population
(Millions) Food Production
(Index)
1961 3,086 49.5
1962 3,147 50.8
1963 3,210 52.1
1964 3,276 53.8
1965 3,343 54.5
1966 3,412 56.8
1967 3,482 59.0
1968 3,554 60.7
1969 3,628 60.8
1970 3,702 62.7
1971 3,777 64.6
1972 3,854 64.0
1973 3,930 67.7
1974 4,006 68.7
1975 4,081 70.5
1976 4,155 72.6
1977 4,227 73.8
1978 4,299 77.4
1979 4,373 78.3
1980 4,447 78.8
1981 4,524 81.4
1982 4,602 84.2
1983 4,682 84.4
1984 4,764 88.8
1985 4,847 90.7
1986 4,933 92.9
1987 5,021 93.3
1988 5,109 94.8
1989 5,197 98.4
1990 5,282 100.8
1991 5,366 100.8
1992 5,447 103.6
1993 5,527 104.5
1994 5,607 108.1
1995 5,687 110.6
1996 5,768 115.1
1997 n/a 116.2

It can be hard to see the trend in a maze of numbers like this, so let's try representing it as a graph.4

Sorry, you must have a Java-enabled browser to see the graph.
Population and Food Production

This graph shows that the first part of the argument is essentially correct: Population does grow exponentially.

But it is absolutely dead wrong about food production. Consistently for the past 35 years, world food production has grown, not more and more slowly, but faster and faster. Indeed, food production is increasing faster than population.

Let's look at the data another way. The FAO also publishes their calculation of world food production per person.1 Here's their data:

Year Food per Person
(index)
1961 84.7
1962 85.2
1963 85.7
1964 86.7
1965 86.1
1966 87.9
1967 89.5
1968 90.2
1969 88.5
1970 89.4
1971 90.3
1972 87.8
1973 90.9
1974 90.5
1975 91.3
1976 92.2
1977 92.2
1978 95.1
1979 94.6
1980 93.6
1981 95.0
1982 96.6
1983 95.3
1984 98.4
1985 98.9
1986 99.4
1987 98.2
1988 98.0
1989 100.0
1990 100.7
1991 99.2
1992 100.4
1993 99.9
1994 101.8
1995 102.7
1996 105.4
1997 104.9

While these numbers have their ups and downs, the general trend is clearly upward.

Note that in 1996 world food production per person was 24% more than it was in 1961 (105.4 divided by 84.7.) Understand, these figures do not say that the world produced 24% more food, but that the world produced 24% more food per person.

The Explanation
How is this possible?
Simple. Technology. Especially since World War II, agricultural technology has been racing ahead. When we think of technology we usually think of machines, and in Western countries this has certainly been a part of it: the tractor, the combine, and so forth have greatly contributed to increasing food production. In the developing countries mechanization is still far behind the West, but other types of technology have proven even more important: fertilizers, irrigation, better weather prediction, and perhaps most important, new strains of crops that grow faster, can thrive in difficult conditions, and are more resistant to disease. Agronomists refer to the introduction of these new crops to the Third World as the "Green Revolution", and it dramatically improved the state of the world's food supply.

Whenever I point out these facts in writing or lectures, somebody invariably objects that these technologies have now "peaked", that all they accomplished was to hold off the inevitable.

This is incredibly pessimistic. Technology has been steadily advancing for thousands of years. In the last two hundred years it has been increasing at a faster and faster pace. But now, they say, it's about to stop. After thousands of years of progress, and despite the fact that the last few years have seen greater progress than at any time before in history, they are absolutely convinced that tomorrow will be the last day and there will never be another new invention, there will never be another scientific discovery, ever again. I find this very hard to believe. There is every reason to presume that technology will continue to advance in the future as it has in the past. I make no claim to know what agricultural technology will look like a hundred years from now, except to say that it will almost certainly be more advanced than it is today.

But let's suppose this pessimistic belief is true. Technology is about to stop dead. If technology will no longer allow us to increase the yield of each crop, is there any other way to increase food production?

Sure. Plant more crops.

According to the FAO5, the world has a total of 13.048 billion hectares of land. (A hectare is about two and a half acres.) Of this, 1.467 billion hectares are being used to grow crops, or 11%. Okay, let's concede that some of this land is unsuitable for farming. The FAO says that 4.003 billion hectares contain buildings or roads, are too barren to be used as farmland, or are of unknown usefullness (due to limitations in trying to collect data from all over the world). This leaves 9.045 billion hectares of reasonably fertile, undeveloped land. Even at that we are only using 16% of the available land.

Granted, there would be adverse consequences to using 100% of this land to grow crops. Land is needed for animals to graze, to provide habitats for wild animals, etc. But if we are presently using only 16% of the world's potential farmland, we surely have a lot of room to maneuver.

Starvation is not imminent. The average citizen of the world today is better fed that at any time in recorded history. And the situation is getting better and better every year. Chicken Little and Al Gore are wrong.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Footnotes
1. Trying to combine numbers for different types of food presents a problem: What unit of measure do you use? The FAO decided on using the monetary value of the food produced, choosing the average price for each commodity for a baseline period (1989-1991), and then calculating production from all over the world based on a single price. This eliminates errors from regional price variations, and price changes over time, including inflation. It does mean that different types of food are evaluated based on their price rather than, say, their nutritional value. But if one counted by calories, you could reply that this ignored vitamins; if one counted vitamins, you could reply that this ignored carbohydrates; etc. For more information, see the FAO's explanation of their index, at "http://www.fao.org/waicent/faostat/agricult/indices-e.htm".
2. United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization. "Agricultural Production Indices." Statistical Database. Rev 1997. http://apps.fao.org/lim500/nph-wrap.pl?CropsPrimary&Domain=PIN (8 Nov 1997)

3. United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization. "Population." Statistical Database Rev 1997. http://apps.fao.org/lim500/nph-wrap.pl?Population (8 Nov 1997)

4. To put food production and population on the same graph, I have expressed population as an index also, with 1961=50 so it starts at about the same place as food production.

5. United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization. "Land Use." Statistical Database. Rev 1997. http://apps.fao.org/lim500/nph-wrap.pl?LandUse (8 Nov 1997) Used 1994 data, the most recent year for which they provided complete statistics.

US food yields over the coming years

Tuesday, March 11, 2008

Running on Empty

End of Suburbia and the future slums of Irvine

By Greg Stacy

Thursday, September 16, 2004 - 12:00 am

It is the Southern California of some decades hence. Beneath a sky heavy with the lingering toxins of generations past, Irvine has fallen to ruin. The suburbs have become weedy slums, and streets once bustling with SUVs are now ominously quiet. Food is also in short supply, and desperate people are doing desperate things to feed their families. Is this the plot of some new, postapocalyptic thriller? Don’t we freaking wish. No, this is the far-too-likely future that all of us face. Apocalypse could just be coming to your neighborhood sooner than you think, and it won’t take World War III to make it happen.

With a minimum of lefty hysterics, the new documentary The End of Suburbia: Oil Depletion and the Collapse of the American Dream explains how America is about to go all Mad Max on us. The simple truth is we are literally running out of gas.

It isn’t news to most of us that oil is a non-renewable resource. We all remember those scratchy movies they showed us in elementary school in which cheerful cartoon dinosaurs explain the basics of fossil fuels. Many of us are even vaguely aware that fossil fuels are supposed to run out sometime in our lifetimes, but we’ve always assumed the government will cook up some sort of viable alternative fuel before things get really dire. Well, we would do well to remember that the government was supposed to have brought peace to the Middle East by now.

The End of Suburbia explains how hydrogen and ethanol, the two energy sources currently being widely touted as potential replacements for oil, simply won’t be able to keep up with the power demands of the world’s ever-increasing population; in fact, it takes more energy to create hydrogen than you’ll ever get from the stuff. Don’t believe W’s hype: there is really nothing in the works that will keep the world’s engines humming as loudly as oil has, and it’s unlikely we’ll come up with anything that will sustain us in the lifestyle to which we’ve grown accustomed. There will be a time of skyrocketing oil costs, increasingly bloody wars over resources and worldwide economic collapse, and eventually all the oil will dry up and the industrial age will grind to a halt. But hey, at least we won’t have to worry about those long commutes anymore, huh?

Directed by Toronto filmmaker Gregory Greene, who leads a post-screening discussion locally, The End of Suburbia isn’t quite as glum as it perhaps sounds. The film has a certain dark wit, and we’re not left to think humanity’s doom is simply inevitable. We may be on the road to disaster, but at least we’re still in the driver’s seat. A few sensible ideas for how we can possibly save our selves from our gristly fate are presented. These ideas do involve a lot of hard choices, sacrifice and self-control—things we Americans seem to get worse at all the time—but there’s still room for optimism. Perhaps these dire circumstances will force us into that communal utopia the hippies were always babbling about, a new age of healthy, responsible living and consciousness expansion and lots of groovy loose sex. . . .

Hmm. If you need me, I’ll be out in my garage, revving my car’s engine for a few hours. Just doing my part to burn off the last of that dinosaur sludge and get this goddamn Age of Aquarius started already.

Peak Oil SUmmary

Peak oil is the point in time when the maximum rate of global petroleum production is reached, after which the rate of production enters its terminal decline. If global consumption is not mitigated before the peak, an energy crisis may develop because the availability of conventional oil will drop and prices will rise, perhaps dramatically. M. King Hubbert first used the theory in 1956 to accurately predict that United States oil production would peak between 1965 and 1970. His model, now called Hubbert peak theory, has since been used to predict the peak petroleum production of many other countries, and has also proved useful in other limited-resource production-domains. According to the Hubbert model, the production rate of a limited resource will follow a roughly symmetrical bell-shaped curve based on the limits of exploitability and market pressures.

Some observers, such as petroleum industry experts Kenneth S. Deffeyes and Matthew Simmons, believe the high dependence of most modern industrial transport, agricultural and industrial systems on the relative low cost and high availability of oil will cause the post-peak production decline and possible severe increases in the price of oil to have negative implications for the global economy. Although predictions as to what exactly these negative effects will be vary greatly, "a growing number of oil-industry chieftains are endorsing an idea long deemed fringe: The world is approaching a practical limit to the number of barrels of crude oil that can be pumped every day."[1]

If political and economic change only occur in reaction to high prices and shortages rather than in reaction to the threat of a peak, then the degree of economic damage to importing countries will largely depend on how rapidly oil imports decline post-peak. The Export Land Model shows that the amount of oil available internationally drops much more quickly than production in exporting countries because the exporting countries maintain an internal growth in demand. Shortfalls in production (and therefore supply) would cause extreme price inflation, unless demand is mitigated with planned conservation measures and use of alternatives, which would need to be implemented 20 years before the peak.[2]

Optimistic estimations of peak production forecast a peak will happen in the 2020s or 2030s and assume major investments in alternatives will occur before a crisis. These models show the price of oil at first escalating and then retreating as other types of fuel and energy sources are used.[3].

Pessimistic predictions of future oil production operate on the thesis that the peak has already occurred[4][5][6][7] or will occur shortly[8] and, as proactive mitigation may no longer be an option, predict a global depression, perhaps even initiating a chain reaction of the various feedback mechanisms in the global market which might stimulate a collapse of global industrial civilization. In early 2008 there are signs that the growing recession was made much worse by rising oil prices[9].

Contents [hide]
1 Demand for oil
1.1 Population
1.1.1 Agriculture and population limits
2 Petroleum Supply
2.1 Reserves
2.1.1 Concerns over stated reserves
2.1.2 Unconventional sources
2.2 Production
2.3 Nationalization of oil supplies‎
3 Timing of peak oil
3.1 Pessimistic predictions of future oil production
3.2 Optimistic predictions of future oil production
3.2.1 Plateau oil
3.2.2 Energy Information Administration and USGS 2000 reports
3.2.3 No Peak Oil
3.2.4 Abiogenesis
4 Possible effects and consequences of Peak Oil
4.1 The Hirsch Report
4.1.1 Conclusions from the Hirsch Report and three scenarios
4.2 Other predictions
4.2.1 Agricultural effects
4.2.2 Transportation and housing
4.3 Mitigation
4.4 Positive aspects of peak oil
5 Peak oil for individual nations
6 Related peaks
7 Oil price
7.1 Effects of rising oil prices
8 Historical understanding of world oil supply limits
9 See also
10 References
11 Further reading
11.1 Books
11.2 Articles
11.3 Reports, essays, and lectures
11.4 DVDs
12 External links
12.1 Web sites
12.2 Online audio, podcasts
12.3 Online videos

[edit] Demand for oil
Further information: Oil consumption rates, Industrialization, and Developing countries

Petroleum: top consuming nations, 1960-2005
United States oil production peaked in 1970. By 2005 imports were twice the production.The demand side of Peak oil is concerned with the consumption over time, and the growth of this demand. World crude oil demand has grown at around 2 percent in recent years. Demand growth is highest in the developing world. World demand for oil is set to increase 37% by 2030, according to the US-based Energy Information Administration's (EIA) annual report. Demand will hit 118 million barrels per day (bpd) from today's existing 86 million barrels, driven in large part by the transportation sector.[10][11]

As countries develop, industry, rapid urbanization and higher living standards drive up energy use, most often of oil. Thriving economies such as China and India are quickly becoming large oil consumers. China has seen oil consumption grow by 8% yearly since 2002, doubling from 1996-2006[12], indicating a doubling rate of less than 10 years. It currently imports roughly half its oil, with predictions of swift continued growth in coming years. India's oil imports are expected to more than triple to some 5 million barrels a day by 2020.[13]

Energy demand is distributed amongst four broad sectors: transportation, residential, commercial, and industrial.[14][15]

The sector that generally sees the highest annual growth in petroleum demand is transportation, in the form of new demand for personal-use gas-powered vehicles.[16] Cars and trucks will cause almost 75% of the increase in oil consumption by India and China between 2001 and 2025.[17] As more countries develop, the demand for oil will increase further. This sector also has the highest consumption rates, accounting for approximately 68.9% of the oil used in the United States in 2006[18], and 55% of oil use worldwide as documented in the Hirsch report. Transportation is therefore of particular interest to those seeking to mitigate the effects of Peak oil.

[edit] Population

World Population GrowthAnother large factor on petroleum demand has been human population growth. Oil production per capita peaked in the 1970s.[19] The world’s population in 2030 is expected to be double that of 1980.[20] Some analysts project that people will be much more oil-dependent than they are now[citation needed], while others predict that oil production in 2030 will have declined back to 1980 levels as worldwide demand for oil significantly out-paces production[21][22]. Some physicists maintain that the long-falling rate of oil production per capita has gone undiscussed because a politically incorrect form of population control may be implied by mitigation.[23]

One factor that has so far helped ameliorate the effect of population growth on demand is the decline of population growth rate since the 1970s. In 1970, the population grew at 2.1%. By 2007, it had declined to 1.167%[24]. From 2000 to 2005, human population only grew by 6.2%[20], whereas global oil production increased by 8.2%. [25]

[edit] Agriculture and population limits
Main article: Agriculture
See also: [[:Agricultural effects of peak oil|Agricultural effects of peak oil]]
Supplies of oil and gas are essential to modern agriculture techniques,[26] so coming decades could see spiraling food prices and unprecedented famine affecting human populations across the globe.[27][28] Geologist Dale Allen Pfeiffer contends that current population levels are unsustainable. To achieve a sustainable economy and avert disaster, he maintains that the United States must reduce its population by at least one-third, and world population will have to be reduced by two-thirds.[29]

Further information: World population

[edit] Petroleum Supply

[edit] Reserves
Main articles: Oil reserves and Peak oil/Table of largest oil fields

2004 U.S. government predictions for oil production other than in OPEC and the former Soviet Union“ All the easy oil and gas in the world has pretty much been found. Now comes the harder work in finding and producing oil from more challenging environments and work areas. ”
— William J. Cummings, ExxonMobil's spokesman in Angola, Dec. 2005, [30]

As Peak oil is concerned with the amount of oil produced over time, the amount of recoverable reserves is important as this determines the amount of oil that can potentially be extracted in the future.

Conventional crude oil reserves include all crude oil that is technically possible to produce from reservoirs through a well bore, using primary, secondary, improved, enhanced, or tertiary methods. This does not include liquids extracted from mined solids or gasses (tar sands, oil shales, gas-to-liquid processes, or coal-to-liquid processes).[31]

Oil reserves are classified as proven, probable and possible. Proven reserves are generally intended to have at least 90% or 95% certainty of containing the amount specified. Probable Reserves have an intended probability of 50%, and the Possible Reserves an intended probability of 5% or 10%.[32] Current technology is capable of extracting about 40% of the oil from most wells. Some speculate that future technology will make further extraction possible,[33] but to some, this future technology is already considered in Proven and Probable reserve numbers.

In many major producing countries, the majority of reserves claims have not been subject to outside audit or examination. Most of the easy-to-extract oil has been found.[30] Recent price increases have led to oil exploration in areas where extraction is much more expensive, such as in extremely deep wells, extreme downhole temperatures, and environmentally sensitive areas or where high-technology will be required to extract the oil. A lower rate of discoveries per explorations has led to a shortage of drilling rigs, increases in steel prices, and overall increases in costs due to complexity.[34][35]

The peak of world oilfield discoveries occurred in 1965.[36] Because world population grew faster than oil production, production per capita peaked in 1979 (preceded by a plateau during the period of 1973-1979).[19]

The amount of oil discovered each year also peaked during the 1960's at around 55 Gb/year, and has been falling steadily since (in 2004/2005 it was about 12 Gb/year). Reserves in effect peaked in 1980, when production first surpassed new discoveries, though creative methods of recalculating reserves has made this difficult to establish exactly[6]

[edit] Concerns over stated reserves
“ [World] reserves are confused and in fact inflated. Many of the so called reserves are in fact resources. They’re not delineated, they’re not accessible, they’re not available for production ”
— Sadad Al-Husseini, former VP of Aramco, Oct. 2007; by Al-Husseini's estimate 300 billion of the world’s 1200 billion barrels of proved reserves should be recategorized as speculative resources. [7]

One difficulty in forecasting the date of peak oil is the opacity surrounding the oil reserves classified as 'proven'. Many worrying signs concerning the depletion of 'proven reserves' have emerged in recent years.[37][38] This was best exemplified by the 2004 scandal surrounding the 'evaporation' of 20% of Shell's reserves.[39]

For the most part, 'proven reserves' are stated by the oil companies, the producer states and the consumer states. All three have reasons to overstate their proven reserves:

Oil companies may look to increase their potential worth.
Producer countries are bestowed a stronger international stature
Governments of consumer countries may seek a means to foster sentiments of security and stability within their economies and among consumers.
The Energy Watch Group (EWG) 2007 report shows total world Proved (P95) plus Probable (P50) reserves to be between 854 and 1255 Gb (30 to 40 years of supply if demand growth were to stop immediately). Major discrepancies arise from accuracy issues with OPEC's self-reported numbers. Besides the possibility that these nations have overstated their reserves for political reasons (during periods of no substantial discoveries), over 70 nations also follow a practice of not reducing their reserves to account for yearly production. 1255 Gb is therefore a best-case scenario.[6] Analysts have suggested that each of the OPEC member nations also has economic incentives to exaggerate their reserves, due to the OPEC quota system, which allows greater output for countries with greater reserves.[33]

The following table shows suspicious jumps in stated reserves without associated discoveries, as well as the lack of depletion despite yearly production:

Declared reserves with suspicious increases in bold purple (in billions of barrels) from Colin Campbell, SunWorld, 80'-95
Year Abu Dhabi Dubai Iran Iraq Kuwait Saudi Arabia Venezuela
1980 28.00 1.40 58.00 31.00 65.40 163.35 17.87
1981 29.00 1.40 57.50 30.00 65.90 165.00 17.95
1982 30.60 1.27 57.00 29.70 64.48 164.60 20.30
1983 30.51 1.44 55.31 41.00 64.23 162.40 21.50
1984 30.40 1.44 51.00 43.00 63.90 166.00 24.85
1985 30.50 1.44 48.50 44.50 90.00 169.00 25.85
1986 31.00 1.40 47.88 44.11 89.77 168.80 25.59
1987 31.00 1.35 48.80 47.10 91.92 166.57 25.00
1988 92.21 4.00 92.85 100.00 91.92 166.98 56.30
1989 92.20 4.00 92.85 100.00 91.92 169.97 58.08
1990 92.20 4.00 93.00 100.00 95.00 258.00 59.00
1991 92.20 4.00 93.00 100.00 94.00 258.00 59.00
1992 92.20 4.00 93.00 100.00 94.00 258.00 62.70
2004 92.20 4.00 132.00 115.00 99.00 259.00 78.00

Kuwait, for example, was reported by a January 2006 issue of Petroleum Intelligence Weekly to have only 48 Gb in reserve, of which only 24 are "fully proven." This report was based on "leaks of confidential documents" from Kuwait, and has not been formally denied by the Kuwaiti authorities. Additionally, the reported 1.5 Gb of oil burned off by Iraqi soldiers in the first Gulf War[40] are conspicuously missing from Kuwait's figures.

On the other hand investigative journalist Greg Palast has argued that oil companies have an interest in making oil look more rare than it is in order to justify higher prices.[41] Other analysts in 2003 argued that oil producing countries understated the extent of their reserves in order to drive up the price of oil.[42]

[edit] Unconventional sources
Main articles: Non-conventional oil, Heavy crude oil, Tar sands, and Oil shale

Raw bitumen is separated from the sand in giant separation cells.Unconventional sources, such as heavy crude oil, tar sands, and oil shale are not counted as part of oil reserves. However, oil companies can book them as proven reserves after opening a strip mine or thermal facility for extraction. Oil industry sources such as Rigzone have stated that these unconventional sources are not as efficient to produce, however, requiring extra energy to refine, resulting in higher production costs and up to three times more greenhouse gas emissions per barrel (or barrel equivalent).[43] While the energy used, resources needed, and environmental effects of extracting unconventional sources has traditionally been prohibitively high, the three major unconventional oil sources being considered for large scale production are the extra heavy oil in the Orinoco river of Venezuela,[44] the tar sands in the Western Canada Basin,[45] and the oil shale in the Green River Formation in Colorado, Utah and Wyoming in the United States.[46][47] Chuck Masters of the USGS estimates that, "Taken together, these resource occurrences, in the Western Hemisphere, are approximately equal to the Identified Reserves of conventional crude oil accredited to the Middle East."[48]

Despite the large quantities of oil available in non-conventional sources, Matthew Simmons argues that limitations on production prevent them from becoming an effective substitute for conventional crude oil. Simmons states that "these are high energy intensity projects that can never reach high volumes" to offset significant losses from other sources.[49] Moreover, oil extracted from these sources typically contains contaminants such as sulfur, heavy metals and carbon that are energy-intensive to extract and leave highly toxic tailings. However, oil prices of over $90 a barrel in 2007 have brought increased attention to potentially mining these sources.[33] The results of one study suggest that within 15 years all the world’s extra oil supply will likely come from unconventional sources.[50]

A 2003 article in Discover magazine claimed that thermal depolymerization could be used to manufacture oil indefinitely, out of garbage, sewage, and agricultural waste. The article claimed that the cost of the process was $15 per barrel.[51] A follow-up article in 2006 stated that the cost was actually $80 per barrel.[52]

[edit] Production
Main articles: Petroleum#Means of production and Extraction of petroleum

OPEC Crude Oil Production 2002-2006. Source:Middle East Economic SurveyThe point in time when peak global oil production occurs is the measure which defines Peak oil. This is because production capacity is the main limitation of supply. Therefore, when production decreases, it becomes the main bottleneck to the petroleum supply/demand equation.

World wide oil production has been less than annual discoveries since 1980.[6] According to several sources, world-wide production is past or near its maximum.[4][5][6][7][8]

World oil production growth trends were flat from 2005 to 2008. The U.S. Energy Information Administration showed in 2008 a production peak in May 2005.[53] According to a January 2007 International Energy Agency report, global supply (which includes biofuels, non-crude sources of petroleum, and use of strategic oil reserves, as well as production) averaged 85.24 mbbl/d in 2006, up 0.76 mbbl/d (0.9%), from 84.48 mbbl/d in 2005.[54] Production in Q3 2007 was 85.08 mbbl/d, down 0.62 mbbl/d (0.7%), from the same period a year earlier. Average yearly gains in world oil production from 1987 to 2005 were 1.2 mbbl/d (1.7%), with yearly gains since 1997 ranging from −1.4 mbbl/d, (-1.9%; 1998–1999) to 3.3 mbbl/d (4.1%; 2003–2004).[citation needed]

Of the largest 21 fields, at least 9 are in decline[55]. In April, 2006, a Saudi Aramco spokesman admitted that its mature fields are now declining at a rate of 8% per year (with a national composite decline of about 2%)[56]. This information has been used to argue that Ghawar, which is the largest oil field in the world and responsible for approximately half of Saudi Arabia's oil production over the last 50 years, has peaked[57][33]. The worlds second largest oil field, the Burgan field in Kuwait, entered decline in November, 2005[58].

Mexico announced that its giant Cantarell Field entered depletion in March, 2006,[59] due to past overproduction. In 2006, Cantarell was declining at a rate of 13% a year[60].

OPEC had vowed in 2000 to maintain a production level sufficient to keep oil prices between $22–28 per barrel, but did not prove possible. In its 2007 annual report, OPEC projected that it could maintain a production level which would stabalize the price of oil at around $50–60 per barrel until 2030.[61] On November 18, 2007, with oil above $98 a barrel, King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia, a long time advocate of stabilized oil prices, announced that his country would not increase production in order to lower prices.[62] Saudia Arabia's inability, as the worlds largest supplier, to stabalize prices through increased production during that period suggests that no nation or organization had the spare production capacity to lower oil prices. The implied that those major suppliers who had not yet peaked were operating at or near full capacity.[33]

Commentators have pointed to the Jack 2 deep water test well in the Gulf of Mexico, announced September 5, 2006,[63] as evidence that there is no imminent peak in global oil production. According to one estimate, the field could account for up to 11% of US production within seven years.[64] However, even though oil discoveries are expected after the peak oil of production is reached[65], the new reserves of oil will be harder to find and extract. The Jack 2 field, for instance, is more than 20,000 feet under the sea floor in 7,000 feet of water, requiring 8.5 kilometers of pipe to reach. Additionally, even the maximum estimate of 15 billion barrels represents slightly less than 2 years of U.S. consumption at present levels[66].

The increasing investment in harder-to-reach oil is a sign of oil companies' belief in the end of easy oil.[30] In addition, while it is widely believed that increased oil prices spur an increase in production, an increasing number of oil industry insiders are now coming to believe that even with higher prices, oil production is unlikely to increase significantly beyond its current level. Among the reasons cited are both geological factors as well as "above ground" factors that are likely to see oil production plateau near its current level.[67]

[edit] Nationalization of oil supplies‎
Main article: Nationalization of oil supplies
Another factor affecting global oil supply is the nationalization of oil reserves by producing nations. The nationalization of oil occurs as countries begin to deprivatize oil production and with-hold exports. Kate Dourian, Platts' Middle East editor, points out that while estimates of oil reserves may vary, politics have now entered the equation of oil supply. "Some countries are becoming off limits. Major oil companies operating in Venezuela find themselves in a difficult position because of the growing nationalization of that resource. These countries are now reluctant to share their reserves."[68]

According to consulting firm PFC Energy, only 7% of the world's estimated oil and gas reserves are in countries that allow companies like ExxonMobil free rein. Fully 65% are in the hands of state-owned companies such as Saudi Aramco, with the rest in countries such as Russia and Venezuela, where access by Western companies is difficult. The PFC study implies political factors are limiting capacity increases in Mexico, Venezuela, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait and Russia. Saudi Arabia is also limiting capacity expansion, but because of a self-imposed cap, unlike the other countries.[69] As a result of not having access to countries amenable to oil exploration, ExxonMobil is not making nearly the investment in finding new oil that it did in 1981.[70]

Alternately, commodities trader Raymond Learsy, author of Over a Barrel: Breaking the Middle East Oil Cartel, contends that OPEC has trained consumers to believe that oil is a much more finite resource than it is. To back his argument, he points to past false alarms and apparent collaboration.[42] He also believes that Peak Oil analysts are conspiring with OPEC and the oil companies to create a "fabricated drama of peak oil" in order to drive up oil prices and profits. It is worth noting oil had risen to a little over $30/barrel at that time. A counter-argument was given in the Huffington Post after he and Steve Andrews, co-founder of ASPO, debated on CNBC in June 2007.[71]

[edit] Timing of peak oil
Main article: Predicting the timing of peak oil

US oil production (crude oil only) and Hubbert high estimate.M. King Hubbert initially predicted in 1974 that peak oil would occur in 1995 "if current trends continue".[72] However, in the late 1970s and early 1980s, global oil consumption actually dropped (due to the shift to energy-efficient cars,[73] the shift to electricity and natural gas for heating,[74] and other factors), then rebounded to a lower level of growth in the mid 1980s. Thus oil production did not peak in 1995, and has climbed to more than double the rate initially projected. This underscores the fact that the only reliable way to identify the timing of peak oil will be in retrospect. However, predictions have been refined through the years as up-to-date information becomes more readily available, such as new reserve growth data.[75] Predictions of the timing of peak oil include the possibilities that it has recently occurred, that it will occur shortly, that a plateau of oil production will sustain supply for up to 100 years, or that oil production will not peak.

[edit] Pessimistic predictions of future oil production
Saudi Arabia's King Abdulla told his subjects in 1998, "The oil boom is over and will not return... All of us must get used to a different lifestyle." Since then he has implemented a series of corruption reforms and government programs intended to lower Saudi Arabia's dependence on oil revenues. The royal family was put on notice to end its history of excess and new industries were created to diversify the national economy.[76]

The Association for the Study of Peak Oil and Gas (ASPO) predicted in their January 2008 newsletter that the peak in all oil (including non-conventional sources), would occur in 2010. This is earlier than the July 2007 newsletter prediction of 2011.[77]

Kenneth S. Deffeyes argues that world oil production peaked on December 16, 2005.[4]

Texas oilman T. Boone Pickens stated in 2005 that worldwide conventional oil production was very close to peaking.[78] Data from the US Energy Information Administration shows that world production leveled out in 2004, and reached a peak in the third quarter of 2006.[5] An October 2007 retrospective report by the Energy Watch Group concluded that this was the peak of conventional oil production.[6]

Sadad Al Husseini, former head of Saudi Aramco's production and exploration, stated in an October 29, 2007 interview that oil production had likely already reached its peak in 2006,[7] and that assumptions by the IEA and EIA of production increases by OPEC to over 45 MB/day are "quite unrealistic."

2004 U.S. government predictions for oil production other than in OPEC and the former Soviet Union
World Crude Oil Production 1960-2004. Sources: DOE/EIA, IEA
Global Oil Supply 1997-2007.[79] Source: U.S. Energy Information AgencyThe July 2007 IEA Medium-Term Oil Market Report projected a 2% non-OPEC liquids supply growth in 2007-2009, reaching 51.0 mb/d in 2008, receding thereafter as the slate of verifiable investment projects diminishes. They refer to this decline as a plateau. The report expects only a small amount of supply growth from OPEC producers, with 70% of the increase coming from Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Angola as security and investment issues continue to impinge on oil exports from Iraq, Nigeria and Venezuela.[80]

In October 2007, the Energy Watch Group, a German research group founded by MP Hans-Josef Fell, released a report claiming that oil production peaked in 2006 and will decline by several percent annually. The authors predict negative economic effects and social unrest as a result.[81][6] They state that the IEA production plateau prediction uses purely economic models which rely on an ability to raise production and discovery rates at will. [6]

Matthew Simmons, Chairman of Simmons & Company International, said on October 26, 2006 that global oil production may have peaked in December 2005, though he cautions that further monitoring of production is required to determine if a peak has actually occurred.[82]

[edit] Optimistic predictions of future oil production

[edit] Plateau oil
Not all non-'peakists' believe there will be endless abundance of oil. CERA, for example, which counts unconventional sources in reserves while discounting EROEI, believes that global production will eventually follow an “undulating plateau” for one or more decades before declining slowly.[3] In 2005 the group had predicted that "petroleum supplies will be expanding faster than demand over the next five years."[83]

Dr. R.C. Vierbuchen, Vice President, Caspian/Middle East Region, ExxonMobil Exploration Co. believes a peak, "from resource limitations, is unlikely in the next 25 years." He claims that future technologies will increase production, and that the peak will be the result of non-production factors.[84]

Similarly, some analysts believe that the rising oil prices will instigate a move toward alternative sources of fuel, and that this will take effect long before oil reserves are depleted[citation needed].

[edit] Energy Information Administration and USGS 2000 reports
The U.S. Energy Information Administration projects world consumption of oil to increase to 98.3 million barrels a day in 2015 and 118 million barrels a day in 2030.[85] This represents more than a 25% increase in world oil production. A 2004 paper by the Energy Information Administration based on data collected in 2000 disagrees with Hubbert peak theory on several points:[16]

Explicitly incorporates demand into model as well as supply
Does not assume pre/post-peak symmetry of production levels
Models pre- and post-peak production with different functions (exponential growth and constant reserves-to-production ratio, respectively)
Assumes reserve growth, including via technological advancement and exploitation of small reservoirs
The EIA estimates of future oil supply are countered by Sadad Al Husseini, retired VP Exploration of Aramco, who calls it a 'dangerous over-estimate'.[86] Husseini also points out that population growth and the emergence of China and India means oil prices are now going to be structurally higher than they have been.

Colin Campbell argues that the 2000 USGS estimates is a methodologically flawed study that has done incalculable damage by misleading international agencies and governments. Campbell dismisses the notion that the world can seamlessly move to more difficult and expensive sources of oil and gas when the need arises. He argues that oil is in profitable abundance or not there at all, due ultimately to the fact that it is a liquid concentrated by nature in a few places having the right geology. Campbell believes OPEC countries raised their reserves to get higher oil quotas and to avoid internal critique. He also points out that the USGS failed to extrapolate past discovery trends in the world’s mature basins.[87]

[edit] No Peak Oil
Some commentors, such as economist Michael Lynch, believe that the Hubbert Peak theory is flawed and that there is no imminent peak in oil production; a view sometimes referred to as "cornucopian" by believers in Hubbert Peak Theory. Lynch argued in 2004 that production is determined by demand as well as geology, and that fluctuations in oil supply are due to political and economic effects in addition to the physical processes of exploration, discovery and production.[88]

Abdullah S. Jum'ah President, Director and CEO of Aramco states that the world has adequate reserves of conventional and non conventional oil sources for more than a century[89][90], though Sadad Al-Husseini, a former Vice President of Aramco who formerly maintained that production would peak in 10-15 years, stated in October 2007 that oil production peaked in 2006[7].

OPEC has never acknowledged imminent Peak oil concerns.[citation needed] In OPEC's 2007 annual book[91], which discusses issues such as future supply position, forecasted demand, and ultimate recoverable reserves (URR), the authors state that the conventional oil resource base is sufficient to satisfy demand increases over the projected period until 2030 at a price of $50-60 per barrel, increasing afterwards to account for inflation. It also states that, comparing the 5% confidence (P5) URR of 3300(sic) billion barrels from the 2000 USGS survey[92] to what appears to be (there is no reference given) the 95% confidence (P95) URR of 1700(sic) billion barrels from the 1980 Rand corporation survey, production after 1980 has been only 1/3rd of reserve additions happening during the same period, which would contrast with Peak oil predictors. However, four other surveys from 1980 give estimates of 2600, 2400, 2280, and 2015 billion barrels.[93] Comparing the average of the five 1980 estimates (2219 billion barrels when using the actual Rand estimate of 1800 billion barrels) to the P95 URR from the 2000 USGS survey (2272 billion barrels), production after 1980 has been over 10 times more than reserve additions.

[edit] Abiogenesis
Main article: Abiogenic petroleum origin
The theory that petroleum derives from biogenic processes is held by the overwhelming majority of petroleum geologists in the United States. Abiogenic theorists however, such as the late professor of astronomy Thomas Gold at Cornell University, assert that the sources of oil may not be “fossil fuels” in limited supply, but instead abiotic in nature. They theorize that if abiogenic petroleum sources are found to be abundant, Earth would contain vast reserves of untapped petroleum.[94] One of the main counter arguments to the abiotic theory is that biomarkers, which have been found in all samples of all the oil and gas accumulations found to date, suggest that oil comes from a biological origin and that oil is generated from kerogen by pyrolysis.[95]

[edit] Possible effects and consequences of Peak Oil
Further information: Malthusian catastrophe, Olduvai theory, and Backstop resources
For information on the timing of peak oil, see Predicting the timing of peak oil
The widespread use of fossil fuels has been one of the most important stimuli of Economic growth and prosperity since the industrial revolution, allowing humans to participate in takedown, or the consumption of energy at a greater rate than it is being replaced. Some believe that when oil production decreases, human culture and modern technological society will be forced to change drastically. The impact of Peak oil will depend heavily on the rate of decline and the development and adoption of effective alternatives. If alternatives are not forthcoming, the products produced with oil (including fertilizers, detergents, solvents, adhesives, and most plastics) would become scarce and expensive. At the very least this could lower living standards in developed and developing countries alike, and in the worst case lead to worldwide economic collapse. With increased tension between countries over dwindling oil supplies, political situations may change dramatically and inequalities between countries and regions may become exacerbated.

[edit] The Hirsch Report
Main article: Hirsch report
In 2005, the US Department of Energy published a report titled Peaking of World Oil Production: Impacts, Mitigation, & Risk Management.[96] Known as the Hirsch report, it stated, "The peaking of world oil production presents the U.S. and the world with an unprecedented risk management problem. As peaking is approached, liquid fuel prices and price volatility will increase dramatically, and, without timely mitigation, the economic, social, and political costs will be unprecedented. Viable mitigation options exist on both the supply and demand sides, but to have substantial impact, they must be initiated more than a decade in advance of peaking."

[edit] Conclusions from the Hirsch Report and three scenarios
World oil peaking is going to happen, and will likely be abrupt.
Oil peaking will adversely affect global economies, particularly those most dependent on oil.
Oil peaking presents a unique challenge (“it will be abrupt and revolutionary”).
The problem is liquid fuels (growth in demand mainly from the transportation sector).
Mitigation efforts will require substantial time.
20 years is required to transition without substantial impacts
A 10 year rush transition with moderate impacts is possible with extraordinary efforts from governments, industry, and consumers
Late initiation of mitigation may result in severe consequences.
Both supply and demand will require attention.
It is a matter of risk management (mitigating action must come before the peak).
Government intervention will be required.
Economic upheaval is not inevitable (“given enough lead-time, the problems are soluble with existing technologies.”)
More information is needed to more precisely determine the peak time frame.
Possible Scenarios:

Waiting until world oil production peaks before taking crash program action leaves the world with a significant liquid fuel deficit for more than two decades.
Initiating a mitigation crash program 10 years before world oil peaking helps considerably but still leaves a liquid fuels shortfall roughly a decade after the time that oil would have peaked.
Initiating a mitigation crash program 20 years before peaking appears to offer the possibility of avoiding a world liquid fuels shortfall for the forecast period.

[edit] Other predictions
Some envisage a Malthusian catastrophe occurring as oil becomes increasingly inefficient to produce. Others claim that applying lessons learned from "mature oil fields" to operational procedures of other basins could preserve their operational tempo[citation needed].

[edit] Agricultural effects
Further information: Agriculture and population limits and Agriculture and petroleum

Tractor and Chaser BinSince the 1940s, agriculture has dramatically increased its productivity, due largely to the use of petrochemical derived pesticides, fertilizers, and increased mechanization (the so-called Green Revolution). This has allowed world population to more than double over the last 50 years. Every energy unit delivered in food grown using modern techniques requires over ten energy units to produce and deliver. Because of modern agriculture's heavy reliance on petrochemicals and mechanization, as well as the lack of any quickly available non-petroleum based alternatives, many agriculture, petroleum, sociology, and ecology experts have warned that the ever decreasing supply of oil will inflict major damage to the modern industrial agriculture system (a list of publications supporting this thesis can be found here in the section: "Food, Land, Water, and Population"), causing a collapse in food production ability and food shortages.

One example of this chain reaction is the effect of petroleum supplies on fertilizer production. By far the biggest fossil fuel input to agriculture is the use of natural gas as a hydrogen source for the Haber-Bosch fertilizer-creation process[97]. Natural gas is used because it is the cheapest currently available source of hydrogen[98][99]. When oil production becomes so scarce that natural gas is used as a partial stopgap replacement, and hydrogen use in transportation increases, natural gas will become much more expensive. If other sources of hydrogen are not available to replace the Haber process, in amounts sufficient to supply transportation and agricultural needs, this major source of fertilizer would either become extremely expensive or unavailable. This would either cause food shortages or dramatic rises in food prices.

One effect of oil shortages (and by far the most sustainable alternative) is a full return to organic agriculture methods. This conversion would take time, as well as major reconditioning of soil which now relies on chemical fertilizers to produce enough food to meet demands. Also, while some farmers using modern organic-farming methods have reported yields as high as those available from conventional farming (but without the use of fossil-fuel-intensive artificial fertilizers or pesticides)[100][101][102][103], this may be more labor-intensive[citation needed] and require a shift of work force from urban to rural areas.

Farmers have also begun raising crops such as corn for non-food use in an effort to help mitigate peak oil. This has already lowered food production[104], an effect which will be exacerbated when demand for ethanol fuels rises. Rising food and fuel costs has already limited the abilities of some charitable donors to send food aid to starving populations.[105] In the UN, some warn that the recent 60% rise in wheat prices could cause "serious social unrest in developing countries."[106]

In 2007, higher incentives for farmers to grow non-food bio-fuel crops combined with other factors (such as over-development of former farm lands, rising transportation costs, climate change, and growing populations) to cause food shortages in Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and Mexico, as well as rising food prices around the globe. Some of these shortages resulted in riots and even deadly stampedes. The rise of bio-fuel uses for oils traditionally used for cooking purposes, such as palm oil, has put further strain on families in countries which rely on cooking oil for the bulk of their daily calories, as well as indiginous tribes displaced by new plantations. "As the multiple conflicts and economic pressures associated with palm oil play out in the global economy, the bottom line seems to be that the world wants more of the oil than it can get." [107]

[edit] Transportation and housing

Housing subdivision near Union, Kentucky, a suburb of Cincinnati, Ohio.A majority of Americans live in suburbs, a type of low-density settlement designed around universal personal automobile use. Electric vehicle, hydrogen power[citation needed], or other technologies[citation needed] may extend the usefulness of these living arrangements, but commentators such as James Howard Kunstler argue that because over 90% of transportation in the United States relies on oil, the suburb's reliance on the automobile is an unsustainable living arrangement. Peak oil would leave many Americans unable to afford petroleum based fuel for their cars, and force them to move to higher density areas, where walking and public transportation are more viable options. Suburbia may become the "slums of the future."[108][109] Methods which have been suggested for mitigating this include transit-oriented development, new pedestrianism, smart growth, shared space, and New Urbanism.

[edit] Mitigation
Main articles: Mitigation of peak oil, Energy conservation, Energy development, and Energy security
To avoid the serious social and economic implications a global decline in oil production could have, the Hirsch report emphasized the need to find alternatives at least 10-20 years before the peak, and to phase out the use of petroleum over that time, similar to the plan Sweden announced in 2005. Such mitigation could include energy conservation, fuel substitution, and the use of non-conventional oil. Because mitigation can reduce the consumption of traditional petroleum sources, it can also affect the timing of peak oil and the shape of the Hubbert curve.

[edit] Positive aspects of peak oil
There are those who believe that peak oil should be viewed as a positive event[citation needed]. Many of these critics reason that if the price of oil rises high enough, the use of alternative clean fuels could help control the pollution and climate effects of fossil fuel use[citation needed]. Others, in particular anarcho-primitivists, are hopeful that it will cause or contribute to the collapse of civilization. [110]

[edit] Peak oil for individual nations
Further information: List of oil fields
Peak Oil as a concept applies globally, but it is based on the summation of individual nations experiencing peak oil. In State of the World 2005, Worldwatch Institute observes that oil production is in decline in 33 of the 48 largest oil-producing countries.[111] Other countries have also passed their individual oil production peaks.

The following list shows significant oil-producing nations and their approximate peak oil production years.[112]

US oil production (crude oil only) and Hubbert high estimate.
Canadian conventional oil production peaked in 1973, but oil sands production is forecast to increase to at least 2020Australia (disputed): 2004; 2001
Egypt: 1987[113]
France: 1988
Germany: 1966
Iran: 1974
India: 1997
Indonesia: 1991[114]
Japan: 1932 (assumed; source does not specify)
Libya: 1970
Mexico: 2003
New Zealand: 1997[115]
Nigeria: 1979
Norway: 2000[116]
Oman: 2000[117]
Russia: 1987
Syria: 1996 [118]
Tobago: 1981[119]
Venezuela: 1970
UK: 1999
USA: 1970[120]
Peak oil production has not been reached in the following nations (these numbers are estimates and subject to revision):[121]

Iraq: 2018
Kuwait: 2013
Saudi Arabia: 2014
In addition, the most recent International Energy Agency and US Energy Information Administration production data show record and rising production in Canada and China.

[edit] Related peaks
The amount of oil discovered each year peaked in the mid 1960's at around 55 Gb/year, and has been falling steadily since then (in 2004/2005 it was about 12 Gb/year)[36]. Reserves in effect peaked in 1980, when production first surpassed new discoveries. Because of world population growth, oil production per capita peaked in 1979 (preceded by a plateau during the period of 1973-1979).[19]

Hubbert's curve has also been used to describe the peak production of other non-renewable resources, such as natural gas, coal, uranium, metals, and even renewable resources like water and fish.[122]

[edit] Oil price
This article or section contains statements that may date quickly and become unclear.
Please improve the article or discuss this issue on the talk page. This article has been tagged since February 2008.

Main articles: Oil price increases of 2004 and later and Price of petroleum

Medium-Term Oil Prices, 1994-2007 (not adjusted for inflation).
Long-Term Oil Prices, 1861-2006 (top line adjusted for inflation).
Gas coupon printed but not used in 1973 oil crisisIn terms of 2007 inflation adjusted dollars, the price of oil peaked at an equivalent of $101 in 1980. Despite wide fluctuations, crude oil prices in the last several years have steadily risen from about $25 a barrel in August of 2003 to over $100 a barrel in January of 2008. These prices are well above where many commentators have predicted economic effects[citation needed]. However the rise in other commodity prices such as gold, and a decline in the US dollar against other signficant currencies might suggest that a signficant part of these price rises is due to monetary inflation.

Helping to fuel these increases are reports from the U.S. Department of Energy and others that show a decline in petroleum reserves, and analysts reporting that petroleum production is at[4][5][6][7] or near full capacity[123][8] [124]. In June 2005, OPEC admitted that they would 'struggle' to pump enough oil to meet pricing pressures for the fourth quarter of that year.[125]

Demand pressures on oil are strong. Global consumption of oil rose from 30 billion barrels in 2004 to 31 billion in 2005. These consumption rates are far above new discoveries, which had fallen to only eight billion barrels of new oil reserves in new accumulations in 2004.[126] In 2005, consumption was within 2 Mbbl/d of production, and at any one time there are about 54 days of stock in the OECD system plus 37 days in emergency stockpiles.

Besides supply and demand pressures, at times security related factors may have contributed to increases in prices[127], including the "War on Terror", missile launches in North Korea, the Crisis between Israel and Lebanon, nuclear brinkmanship between the US and Iran[dead link][128], the incursion by Turkey into Northern Iraq[citation needed], and hurricanes[citation needed].

Another factor in oil price is the cost of extracting crude. As the extraction of oil has become more difficult, oil's historically high ratio of Energy Returned on Energy Invested has seen a significant decline. The increased price of oil makes non-conventional sources of oil retrieval more attractive. For example, tar sands are a far less cost-efficient source of heavy, low-grade oil compared to conventional crude, but can become attractive to exploration and production companies when prices are high enough to cover production. Recent months have seen billions of dollars invested in the tar (bitumen) sands[citation needed].

Despite the rapid increase in the price of oil, neither the stock markets nor the growth of the global economy have been noticeably affected[citation needed], though inflation has increased. In the United States, inflation averaged 3.3% in 2005-2006, as compared to an average of 2.5% in the preceding 10-year period.[129] As a result, during this period the Federal Reserve has consistently increased interest rates to curb inflation.

An oil price chart can be seen here.

[edit] Effects of rising oil prices
Main article: Effects of oil price

World power usage in terawatts (TW), 1965-2005.[130]In the past, the price of oil has led to economic recessions, such as the 1973 and 1979 energy crises. The effect the price of oil has on an economy is known as a price shock. In many European countries, which have high taxes on fuels, such price shocks could potentially be mitigated somewhat by temporarily or permanently suspending the taxes as fuel costs rise.[131]. This method of softening price shocks is even less viable to countries with much lower gas taxes, such as the United States.

Some economists predict that a substitution effect will spur demand for alternate energy sources, such as coal or liquefied natural gas. This substitution can only be temporary, as coal and natural gas are finite resources as well.

Prior to the runup in fuel prices, many motorists opted for larger, less fuel-efficient sport utility vehicles and full-sized pickups in the United States, Canada and other countries. This trend has been reversing due to sustained high prices of fuel. The September 2005 sales data for all vehicle vendors indicated SUV sales dropped while small cars sales increased. Hybrid and diesel vehicles are also gaining in popularity.[citation needed]

[edit] Historical understanding of world oil supply limits
Although the finiteness of the earth's oil supply means that peak oil is inevitable, technological innovations in finding and drilling for oil have at times changed the understanding of the total oil supply on Earth.[132]

In 1855, people could only access whatever oil happened to seep to the surface, and an advertisement for Kier's Rock Oil stated, "Hurry, before this wonderful product is depleted from Nature’s laboratory."
In 1874, the state geologist of Pennsylvania, the United States' leading oil-producing state, said that all the oil would be gone by 1878.
In 1920, the U.S. Geological Survey stated that the world only had 60 billion barrels of oil left.
In 1950, geologists estimated that the world had 600 billion barrels of oil.
Since the 1960s, major oil surveys have shown P95 EUR of close to 2,000 billion barrels (see below).
In 1970, scientists estimated that the world had 1,500 billion barrels of oil.
In 1994, the U.S. Geological Survey estimated that the world had 2,400 billion barrels of oil.
In 2000, the U.S. Geological Survey estimated that the world had 3,000 billion barrels of oil (P95 EUR of 2,300 billion barrels—see below).
The 95% confidence Estimated Ultimate Retrieval (EUR) of a little under 2,000 billion barrels has been the average finding of major oil surveys since 1965. The 2000 USGS survey assumed a discovery trend over the next 20 years which would completely and dramatically reverse the observed trend of the past 40 years. Their 95% confidence EUR of 2,300 billion barrels assumed that discovery levels would stay steady, despite discovery levels having fallen quickly and steadily since the 1960s. That trend of falling discoveries has continued in the 7 years since the USGS made their assumption.[6]

None of this means that new oil is forming, or that peak oil will never happen, but it implies that technological advances have allowed the discovery and recovery of more oil than was historically expected. As oil estimates have remained steady since the 1960s this appears to no longer be the case, as can be seen above. Nevertheless, one significant source of uncertainty is the continuing inability to independently audit stated reserves from many of the world's biggest oil producers.

[edit] See also
Energy Portal
Sustainable development Portal
Category:Peak oil
Prediction

Backstop resources
Global strategic petroleum reserves
Hirsch report
Malthusian catastrophe
Oil depletion
Oil reserves
Oil Megaprojects
Olduvai theory
World energy resources and consumption
Economics

Gross domestic product per barrel
Kuznets curve
Low-carbon economy
Oil crises
Oil Storm, a docudrama about a future oil-shortage crisis.
Oil imperialism theories
OPEC
Oil price increases of 2004-2007
Technology

Energy conservation
Energy efficiency
Energy development
Fuel economy in automobiles
Renewable energy
Soft energy path
Others

Energy Crisis and The Power of Community: How Cuba Survived Peak Oil, a documentary about theSpecial Period - Events in Cuba in the 1990s following the withdrawal of cheap Soviet oil exports.
Oil phase-out in Sweden
Energy security
Limits to Growth
Overpopulation
Overconsumption
Green Revolution
Causes of hypothetical future disasters

[edit] References
^ RUSSELL GOLD and ANN DAVIS. "Oil Officials See Limit Looming on Production", The Wallstreet Journal, 2007-11-10. (English)
^ Richard Gwyn. "Demand for Oil Outstripping Supply", Toronto Star, 2004-01-28. (English)
^ a b "CERA says peak oil theory is faulty", Energy Bulletin, 2006-11-14. (English)
^ a b c d Kenneth S. Deffeyes (2007-01-19). Current Events - Join us as we watch the crisis unfolding (English). Princeton University: Beyond Oil.
^ a b c d Ryan McGreal (2007-10-22). Yes, We're in Peak Oil Today (English). Raise the Hammer.
^ a b c d e f g h i j Dr. Werner Zittel, Jorg Schindler (2007-10). Crude Oil: The Supply Outlook (English). Energy Watch Group.
^ a b c d e f Dave Cohen (October 31, 2007). The Perfect Storm (English). ASPO-USA.
^ a b c Rembrandt H.E.M. Koppelaar (2006-09). World Production and Peaking Outlook (PDF) (English). Peak Oil Netherlands.
^ Joe Bel Bruno. "Oil Rally May Be Economy's Undoing", AP, Saturday March 8. Retrieved on Saturday March 8.
^ World oil demand 'to rise by 37%' (English). BBC News (2006-06-20).
^ 2007 International Energy Outlook: Petroleum and other liquid fuels (English). U.S. Energy Information Administration (May 2007).
^ International Petroleum (Oil) Consumption Data (English). U.S. Energy Information Administration. Retrieved on 2007-12-20.
^ China and India: A Rage for Oil (English). Business Week (2005-08-25).
^ Annual Energy Report (English). US Department of Energy (2006-07).
^ Global Oil Consumption (English). U.S. Energy Information Administration. Retrieved on 2007-12-20.
^ a b John H. Wood, Gary R. Long, David F. Morehouse (2004-08-18). Long-Term World Oil Supply Scenarios: The Future Is Neither as Bleak or Rosy as Some Assert (English). Energy Information Administration.
^ Asia's Thirst for Oil (English). Wall Street Journal (2004-05-05).
^ Domestic Demand for Refined Petroleum Products by Sector (English). U.S. Bureau of Transportation Statistics. Retrieved on 2007-12-20.
^ a b c Duncan, Richard C. (November 2001). "The Peak of World Oil Production and the Road to the Olduvai Gorge" (in English). Population & Environment 22 (5): pp. 503-522. doi:10.1023/A:1010793021451. ISSN (Print) 1573-7810 (Online) 0199-0039 (Print) 1573-7810 (Online).
^ a b Total Midyear Population for the World: 1950-2050. U.S. Census Bureau. Retrieved on 2007-12-20.
^ Matt Savinar. Are We 'Running Out'? I Thought There Was 40 Years of the Stuff Left (English). Life After the Oil Crash. Retrieved on 2007-12-20.
^ Katharine Mieszkowski (2006-03-22). The oil is going, the oil is going!. Salon.com. Retrieved on 2008-03-08.
^ Albert A. Bartlett (2004-08-27). Thoughts on Long-Term Energy Supplies: Scientists and the Silent Lie (PDF). Physics Today. Retrieved on 2008-03-08.
^ CIA Factbook
^ Table of World Oil Production 2006 (pdf). BP. Retrieved on 2007-12-20.
^ How peak oil could lead to starvation
^ Peak Oil: the threat to our food security
^ Agriculture Meets Peak Oil
^ Eating Fossil Fuels
^ a b c "Price rise and new deep-water technology opened up offshore drilling", The Boston Globe, 2005-12-11. (English)
^ Oil industry report says demand to outpace crude oil production - International Herald Tribune
^ http://www.og.dti.gov.uk/information/bb_updates/chapters/Table4_3.htm
^ a b c d e Peter Maass. "The Breaking Point", New York Times, August 21, 2005. (English)
^ "Briefing: Exxon increases budget for oil exploration", Bloomberg, 2007-03-07. (English)
^ "Shell plans huge spending increase", International Herald Tribune, 2005-12-14. (English)
^ a b C.J.Campbell (2000-12). Peak Oil Presentation at the Technical University of Clausthal] (English).
^ Top Oil Groups Fail to Recoup Exploration, James Boxell, New York Times, 2004-10-10
^ Forecast of Rising Oil Demand Challenges Tired Saudi Fields, Jeff Gerth, New York Times, February 24, 2004.
^ Carl Morsfeld "How Shell blew a hole in a 100-year reputation" 2004-10-10, The Times.
^ The Trade Environment Database. The Economic and Environmental Impact of the Gulf War on Kuwait and the Persian Gulf. Retrieved on 2007-11-18.
^ No Peaking: The Hubbert Humbug Guerrilla News Network, Tue, 23 May 2006. Accessed 11/16/07
^ a b OPEC Follies - Breaking point (English). National Review (2003-12-04).
^ Duarte Joe (2006-03-28). Canadian Tar Sands: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly (English). RigZone.
^ Environmental Challenges of Heavy Crude Oils (English). Batelle (2003).
^ Tar Sands: A brief overview.
^ Dyni, John R. (2003), "Geology and resources of some world oil-shale deposits (Presented at Symposium on Oil Shale in Tallinn, Estonia, November 18-21, 2002)", Oil Shale. A Scientific-Technical Journal (Estonian Academy Publishers) 20 (3): 193-252, ISSN 0208-189X, . Retrieved on 17 June 2007
^ Strategic Significance of America’s Oil Shale Resource. Volume II Oil Shale Resources, Technology and Economics, Office of Deputy Assistant Secretary for Petroleum Reserves; Office of Naval Petroleum and Oil Shale Reserves; U.S. Department of Energy, 2004, . Retrieved on 23 June 2007
^ Excluding Unconventional World Oil Reserves
^ Resource Investor - Energy - Oil Doomsday is Nigh, Tar Sands Not a Substitute
^ Carola Hoyos. "Study sees harmful hunt for extra oil", Financial Times, 2007-02-18. (English)
^ (2003) "Anything Into Oil". DISCOVER Magazine.
^ (2006) "Anything Into Oil". DISCOVER Magazine.
^ January 2008 International Petroleum Monthly (XLS) (English). Energy Information Administration (2008-02-11).
^ World Oil Supply and Demand (PDF) (English). International Energy Agency (2007-01-18).
^ Peak Oil and Energy Resources (English).
^ Ryan McGreal. "Peak Oil for Saudi Arabia?", Raise the Hammer, 2006-04-29. (English)
^ Matthew S. Miller. "Ghawar Is Dead!", Energy Bulletin, 2007-03-09. (English)
^ James Cordahi and Andy Critchlow. "Kuwait Oil Field, World's Second Largest, 'Exhausted'", Bloomberg, 2005-11-09. (English)
^ "Canales: Output will drop at Cantarell field", El Universal, 2006-02-10. (English)
^ Adriana Arai. "Mexico's Largest Oil Field Output Falls to 4-Year Low", 2006-08-01 (dead). (English)
^ http://www.opec.org/library/World%20Oil%20Outlook/pdf/WorldOilOutlook.pdf
^ OPEC SUMMIT ROUNDUP Production hike prospects fade as Abu Dhabi summit looms - Forbes.com
^ "Chevron Announces Record Setting Well Test at Jack", Chevron, 2006-09-05. (English)
^ U.S. Oil Reserves Get a Big Boost - washingtonpost.com
^ Greg Geyer. "Jack-2 Test Well Behind The Hype", Association for the Study of Peak Oil and Gas, 2006-09-19. (English)
^ Official Energy Statistics from the U.S. Government, Energy Information Administration.
^ Peg Mackey and Alex Lawler (January 9, 2008). Tough to pump more oil, even at $100 (English). Reuters.
^ Non-OPEC peak oil threat receding (English). Arabian Business (2007-07-06).
^ Sheila McNulty. "Politics of oil seen as threat to supplies", Financial Times, 2007-05-09. (English)
^ Justin Fox. "No More Gushers for ExxonMobil", Time magazine, 2007-05-31. (English)
^ Rejecting the Real 'Snake Oil' (English). Huffington Post (2007-06-29).
^ Noel Grove, reporting M. King Hubbert (June 1974). "Oil, the Dwindling Treasure" (in English). National Geographic.
^ Light-Duty Automotive Technology and Fuel Economy Trends: 1975 Through 2006 - Executive Summary (English). EPA EPA420-S-06-003 (2006-07).
^ Ferenc L. Toth, Hans-Holger Rogner, (2006). "Oil and nuclear power: Past, present, and future" (in English). Energy Economics 28 (1 – 25): pg. 3.
^ Reserve Growth (English). USGS.
^ Macleod Scott (2002-02-25). How to Bring Change to the Kingdom. Time.
^ Newsletter (PDF). Association for the Study of Peak Oil and Gas (2008-01).
^ Boone Pickens Warns of Petroleum Production Peak. Association for the Study of Peak Oil and Gas (2005-05-03).
^ {{cite web |url=www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/ipsr/t14.xls |publisher=U.S. Energy Information Agency
^ "Medium-Term Oil Market Report", IEA, 2007-07. (English)
^ Seager Ashley (2007-10-22). Steep decline in oil production brings risk of war and unrest, says new study. The Guardian.
^ Peak oil (2006-10-28).
^ "One energy forecast: Oil supplies grow", Christian Science Monitor, 2005-06-22.
^ Vierbuchen R.C. (2007-02-28). Production of global hydrocarbon liquids: Is there a near term peak?. Houston Geological Society.
^ World Oil Consumption by region, Reference Case (PDF). EIA (2006).
^ "Oil expert: US overestimates future oil supplies", Channel 4 News.
^ "Campbell replies to USGS: Global Petroleum Reserves - A View to the Future", Oil Crisis, 2002-12-01. (English)
^ Lynch Michael C (2004). The New Pessimism about Petroleum Resources: Debunking the Hubbert Model (and Hubbert Modelers) (PDF). American Geophysical Union, Fall Meeting 2004.
^ Aramco chief says world's Oil reserves will last for more than a century. Oil and Gas Journal.
^ Jum’ah Abdallah S.. Rising to the Challenge: Securing the Energy Future. World Energy Source.
^ Oil outlook for the year 2007 (PDF).
^ U.S. Geological Survey Digital Data Series 60 (PDF). US Geological Service.
^ Relationship between Giant Field Data and Ultimate Recoverable Oil (PDF).
^ Nyquist JR (2006-05-08). Debunking Peak Oil. Financial Sense.
^ Mello MR, Moldowan JM (2005). Petroleum: To Be Or Not To Be Abiogenic. searchanddiscovery.net.
^ http://www.netl.doe.gov/publications/others/pdf/Oil_Peaking_NETL.pdf
^ Raw Material Reserves - International Fertilizer Industry Association [1]
^ Integrated Crop Management-Iowa State University January 29, 2001 [2]
^ The Hydrogen Economy-Physics Today Magazine, December 2004 [3]
^ Realities of organic farming
^ http://extension.agron.iastate.edu/organicag/researchreports/nk01ltar.pdf
^ Organic Farming can Feed The World!
^ Organic Farms Use Less Energy And Water
^ Record rise in wheat price prompts UN official to warn that surge in food prices may trigger social unrest in developing countries
^ Rising food prices curb aid to global poor
^ Record rise in wheat price prompts UN official to warn that surge in food prices may trigger social unrest in developing countries
^ Keith Bradsher (January 19, 2008). A New, Global Oil Quandary: Costly Fuel Means Costly Calories (English). New York Times.
^ Kunstler, James Howard (1994). Geography Of Nowhere: The Rise And Decline of America's Man-Made Landscape. New York: Simon & Schuster. ISBN 0-671-88825-0
^ James Howard Kunstler. The tragedy of suburbia. Monterey, CA: TED: Ideas worth sharing.
^ Jensen, Derrick (2006). Endgame, Volume 1: The Problem of Civilization. New York City: Seven Stories Press. ISBN 978-1-58322-730-5.
^ WorldWatch Institute (2005-01-01). State of the World 2005: Redefining Global Security (in English). New York: Norton, 107. ISBN ISBN 0-393-32666-7.
^ Unless otherwise specified, source is ABC TV's Four Corners.
^ Egypt Crude Oil Production and Consumption by Year (Thousand Barrels per Day)
^ Indonesia Crude Oil Production and Consumption by Year (Thousand Barrels per Day)
^ New Zealand Crude Oil Production by Year (Thousand Barrels per Day)
^ Helge Lund: - «Peak Oil» har kommet til Norge ( Olje , Statoil )
^ Oman Crude Oil Production and Consumption by Year (Thousand Barrels per Day)
^ Syrian Arab Republic Crude Oil Production and Consumption by Year (Thousand Barrels per Day)
^ Trinidad and Tobago Crude Oil Production by Year (Thousand Barrels per Day)
^ http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/aer/txt/stb0501.xls
^ Four Corners Broadband Edition: Peak Oil
^ Richard Heinberg's Museletter- Peak Everything (English). Post Carbon Institute (2007-9-3).
^ name="wsj111907golddavis" RUSSELL GOLD and ANN DAVIS. "Oil Officials See Limit Looming on Production", The Wallstreet Journal, 2007-11-10. (English)
^ Global oil prices jump to 11-month highs (English). Petroleum World (07 09 07).
^ "Oil prices rally despite OPEC output hike", MSNBC, 2005-06-15. (English)
^ Oil Market Report - Demand (English). International Energy Agency (2006-07-12).
^ Global oil prices jump to 11-month highs (English). Petroleum World (07 09 07).
^ [4][dead link]
^ The United States Inflation Rate By Year
^ World Consumption of Primary Energy by Energy Type and Selected Country Groups, 1980-2004 (XLS). Energy Information Administration, U.S. Department of Energy (July 31, 2006). Retrieved on 2007-01-20.
^ James Kanter (November 9, 2007). European politicians wrestle with high gasoline prices (English). International Herald Tribune.
^ Deming, David (2003-01-29). Are We Running Out of Oil?. National Center for Policy Analysis. Retrieved on 2007-11-01.

[edit] Further reading

[edit] Books
Colin J. Campbell,
Campbell, Colin J. (2004). The Essence of Oil & Gas Depletion. Multi-Science Publishing. ISBN 0-906522-19-6.
Campbell, Colin J. (2004). The Coming Oil Crisis. Multi-Science Publishing. ISBN 0-906522-11-0.
Campbell, Colin J. (2005). Oil Crisis. Multi-Science Publishing. ISBN 0-906522-39-0.
Kenneth S. Deffeyes,
Deffeyes, Kenneth S. (2002). Hubbert's Peak:The Impending World Oil Shortage. Princeton University Press. ISBN 0-691-09086-6.
Deffeyes, Kenneth S. (2005). Beyond Oil: The View from Hubbert's Peak. Hill and Wang. ISBN 0-8090-2956-1.
Eberhart, Mark (2007). Feeding the Fire: The Lost History and Uncertain Future of Mankind's Energy Addiction. Harmony. ISBN 978-0307237446.
Goodstein, David (2005). Out of Gas: The End of the Age Of Oil. W. W. Norton. ISBN 0-393-05857-3.
Richard Heinberg,
Heinberg, Richard (2003). The Party's Over: Oil, War, and the Fate of Industrial Societies. New Society Publishers. ISBN 0-86571-482-7.
Heinberg, Richard (2004). Power Down: Options and Actions for a Post-Carbon World. New Society Publishers. ISBN 0-86571-510-6.
Heinberg, Richard (2006). The Oil Depletion Protocol: A Plan to Avert Oil Wars, Terrorism and Economic Collapse. New Society Publishers. ISBN 10: 0-86571-563-7.
Huber, Peter (2005). The Bottomless Well. Basic Books. ISBN 0-465-03116-1.
Kleveman, Lutz C. (2004). The New Great Game: Blood and Oil in Central Asia. Atlantic Monthly Press. ISBN 0-87113-906-5.
Kunstler, James H. (2005). The Long Emergency: Surviving the End of the Oil Age, Climate Change, and Other Converging Catastrophes. Atlantic Monthly Press. ISBN 0-87113-888-3.
Leggett, Jeremy (2005). The Empty Tank: Oil, Gas, Hot Air, and the Coming Financial Catastrophe. Random House. ISBN 1-4000-6527-5.
Leggett, Jeremy (2005). Half Gone: Oil, Gas, Hot Air and the Global Energy Crisis. Portobello Books Ltd. ISBN 1-8462-7004-9.
Lovins, Amory et al (2005). Winning the Oil Endgame: Innovation for Profit, Jobs and Security. Rocky Mountain Institute. ISBN 1-881071-10-3.
Pfeiffer, Dale Allen (2004). The End of the Oil Age. Lulu Press. ISBN 1-4116-0629-9.
Rashid, Ahmed,
Rashid, Ahmed (2001). Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia. Yale University Press. ISBN 0-300-08902-3.
Rashid, Ahmed (2003). Jihad: The Rise of Militant Islam in Central Asia. Yale University Press. ISBN 0-300-09345-4.
Rifkin, Jeremy (2002). The Hydrogen Economy: After Oil, Clean Energy From a Fuel-Cell-Driven Global Hydrogen Web. Blackwell Publishers. ISBN 0-7456-3042-1.
Ruppert, Michael C. (2005). Crossing the Rubicon: The Decline of the American Empire at the End of the Age of Oil. New Society. ISBN-13: 978-0865715400.
Simmons, Matthew R. (2005). Twilight in the Desert: The Coming Saudi Oil Shock and the World Economy. ISBN 0-471-73876-X.
Shah, Sonia (2004). Crude, The Story of Oil. Seven Stories Press. ISBN 1-58322-625-7.
Simon, Julian L. (1998). The Ultimate Resource. Princeton University Press. ISBN 0-691-00381-5.
Smil, Vaclav (2005). Energy at the Crossroads: Global Perspectives and Uncertainties. MIT Press. ISBN 0-262-19492-9.
Stansberry, Mark A. with Jason Reimbold (2008). The Braking Point. Hawk Publishing. ISBN 978-1-930709-67-6.
Tertzakian, Peter (2006). A Thousand Barrels a Second. McGraw-Hill. ISBN 0-07-146874-9.
Yeomans, Matthew (2004). Oil, Anatomy of an Industry. ISBN 1-56584-885-3.
Yergin, Daniel (1993). The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money & Power. Free Press. ISBN 0-671-79932-0.

[edit] Articles
Scott W. Tinker. "Of peaks and valleys: Doomsday energy scenarios burn away under scrutiny", Dallas Morning News, 2005-06-25. (English)
Katie Benner. "Lawmakers: Will we run out of oil?", CNN, 2005-12-07. (English)
Katie Benner. "Oil: Is the end at hand?", CNN, 2004-11-03. (English)
John V. Mitchell (2006-08). A New Era for Oil Prices (English).
The Future of Oil (English). Foreign Policy.
Colin Campbell & Jean Laherrère. The End of Cheap Oil (English). Scientific American.
press release (English). International Energy Agency.
Mark Williams. The End of Oil? (English). MIT Technology Review.
Tim Appenzeller. The End of Cheap Oil (English). National Geographic.
Michael C. Lynch. The New Pessimism about Petroleum Resources (English).
Robert Rapier. Peak Lite (English).
Robert E. Snyder. Oil shale back in the picture (English).
Paul Roberts (2004-08). "Last Stop Gas" (in English). Harper's Magazine: pp. 71-72.
Larry West. Sweden aims to be world's first oil-free nation by 2020 (English).
'Peak oil' enters mainstream debate (English). BBC News.
Dan Welch. Between Peak Oil and Climate Change (English). The Peakist.
Donna Mosher. Actions everyone can take to prepare for the possible end of an era (English). Citizens League for Environmental Action Now.
Peak Oil & Aviation (English).
Anonymous (2005-02-20). A letter from oil exploration insider (English). Energy Bulletin.
Troy Cochrane (2008-01-04). Peak oil?: Oil supply and accumulation (English). Cultural Shifts.

[edit] Reports, essays, and lectures
Crude Oil - The Supply Outlook (English). Energy Watch Group (2007-10-22).
Doctoral thesis: Giant Oil Fields - The Highway to Oil: Giant Oil Fields and their Importance for Future Oil Production (English). Uppsala University (2007-03-30).
Review: Oil-based technology and economy - prospects for the future (English). The Danish Board of Technology (Teknologirådet) (2005-06-09).
Jim Bliss (2005-07-05). An Introduction to Peak Oil (English).
The End of Oil (PDF) (English). University of Otago Department of Physics (2005-07).
Peak Oil Theory – “World Running Out of Oil Soon” – Is Faulty; Could Distort Policy & Energy Debate (English). CERA (2006-11-14).
Australia’s future oil supply and alternative transport fuels (English). Parliament of Australia - Senate (2007-02-07).

[edit] DVDs
Crude Awakening: The Oil Crash (2006)
The End of Suburbia: Oil Depletion and the Collapse of the American Dream (2004)
The Power of Community: How Cuba Survived Peak Oil (2006)
What a Way to Go: Life at the End of Empire (2007)

[edit] External links
[edit] Web sites
ASPO International - Association for the Study of Peak Oil & Gas
Culture Change - life after the peak.
Eating Fossil Fuels
Energy Bulletin Peak Oil related articles
From The Wilderness original peak oil reporting
Energy Supply page at The Global Education Project Charts and graphs on current energy reserves and use, and peak oil.
Global Oil Watch - Extensive Peak Oil Library
The Oil Drum Discussions about Energy and our Future
PeakOil.com - news and discussion
Peak Oil For Dummies - concise quotes from renowned politicians, oil executives, and analists
PowerSwitch in the United Kingdom
U.S. Energy Information Agency Petroleum Data
[edit] Online audio, podcasts
David Holmgren (2004-07-28). David Holmgren talks about Peak Oil and Permaculture. archive.org.
[edit] Online videos
Rep. Prof. Roscoe Bartlett's to U.S. House of Representatives (English). Energy Bulletin (2005-04-05).
OneWorldTV Video interview with Richard Heinberg
Informative and brief (12 minute) Australian video about the problem
Peak Oil: brief overview slide show by Powerswitch.org.uk
Peak Oil? ABC (Australian Broadcasting Corporation) Includes interviews with Colin Campbell, Robert Hirsch, Chris Skrebowski, and others.
Arithmetic, Population and Energy. Dr. Albert Bartlett (Both video and MP3 available. A transcript is also available)
A post-oil man. A humorous look at preparing for peak oil.
Crude Awakening. A presentation by Tim Hudson.
Roscoe Bartlett explains peak oil in US Congress
Peak Aware: free online videos about peak oil
EnergyChallenge TV - Peak Oil Video and Audio (English). ASPO-USA (2007-02-12).

[hide]v • d • ePeak Oil
Issues Peak oil • Mitigation of peak oil • Predicting the timing of peak oil • Hubbert peak theory • Hirsch report • Oil Depletion Protocol
People Colin J. Campbell • Albert Bartlett • David Goodstein • Richard Heinberg • James Kunstler • Jeremy Leggett • Matthew Simmons • Peaknik • Doomer
Books The Long Emergency • The Party's Over • Power Down
Films Crude Awakening • The End of Suburbia • How Cuba Survived Peak Oil • What a Way to Go
Organizations ASPO • Energy Watch Group

Peak Oil

Thursday, March 13, 2008

THE PEAK OF WORLD OIL PRODUCTION AND THE ROAD TO THE OLDUVAI GORGE

Wiki Notes on Malthusian Prediction

World Food Production

The Prediction

US food yields over the coming years

More Info on global Peak oil Problem

Tuesday, March 11, 2008

Running on Empty

Peak Oil SUmmary

Blog Archive

About Me

Thursday, March 13, 2008

Tuesday, March 11, 2008

Subscribe To

Blog Archive

About Me